Tag: democratic

  • Czech Republic Country Profile

    Czech Republic Country Profile

    The Czech Republic is a unitary parliamentary republic located in Central Europe. It consists of the historical provinces of Bohemia and Moravia along with the southern tip of Silesia, which are often called the “Czech Lands” The Czech Republic is bordered by countries such as Germany, Austria, Poland, and Slovakia, has an area of approximately 78,866 square kilometers, and a population of a little less than 11 million. The Czech Republic plays an important role in the wider context of European politics due to its central location between both Germany and Russia, reputation as one of the most stable and freest countries in Europe, and past struggles for independence from regional powers.

    The Czech Republic has a long and rich history and is considered to be one of the first areas in which modern humans settled,

    The history of the Czech Republic can be traced back to the Lower Paleolithic era when the earliest modern humans settled in the region. Some of the Paleolithic cultures that settled in the present-day Czech Republic included the Acheulean, Micoquien, Mousterian, and Předmostí. The area was subsequently settled by the Celts in the 5th Century BC and by various Germanic tribes during the 1st Century CE. During the 5th century CE, Slavic tribes from the Vistula basin settled in the region of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia. The Czechs founded the kingdom of Bohemia and the Premyslide dynasty, which ruled Bohemia and Moravia from the 10th to the 16th century. One of the Bohemian kings, Charles IV, Holy Roman Emperor, made Prague an imperial capital and a center of Latin scholarship. The Hussite movement founded by Jan Hus (1369–1415) linked the Slavs to the Reformation and revived Czech nationalism, previously under German domination. A Hapsburg, Ferdinand I, ascended the throne in 1526. The Czechs rebelled in 1618, precipitating the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). Defeated in 1620, they were ruled for the next 300 years as part of the Austrian empire. Full independence from the Hapsburgs was not achieved until the end of World War I, following the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire.

    The Czech Republic witnessed a high level of political oppression during the periods in which it was occupied by Nazi Germany (1938-45), and the Soviet Union (1948-89).

    A union of the Czech lands and Slovakia was proclaimed in Prague on Nov. 14, 1918, and the Czech Republic became one of the two component parts of the newly formed Czechoslovakia. In March 1939, German troops occupied Czechoslovakia, and Czech Bohemia and Moravia became protectorates of Nazi for the duration of World War II. The former government returned in April 1945 when the war ended and the country’s pre-1938 boundaries were restored. When elections were held in 1946, Communists became the dominant political party and gained control of the Czechoslovakian government by 1948. During the period of communist rule, the Czech Republic witnessed atrocities committed by the Communist government and was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1968 in response to its attempts to break away from the Warsaw Pact.

    Over four decades of Communist rule ended with the nearly bloodless “velvet revolution” in 1989. Václav Havel, a leading playwright and dissident, was elected president of Czechoslovakia in 1989. Havel, imprisoned twice by the Communist regime and his plays banned, became an international symbol for human rights, democracy, and peaceful dissent. The return of democratic political reform saw a strong Slovak nationalist movement emerge by the end of 1991, which sought independence for Slovakia. When the general elections of June 1992 failed to resolve the continuing coexistence of the two republics within the federation, Czech and Slovak political leaders agreed to separate their states into two fully independent nations. On Jan. 1, 1993, the Czechoslovakian federation was dissolved and two separate independent countries were established—the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Czech Republic joined NATO in March 1999 and the European Union in 2004.

    Miloš Zeman is the current President of the Czech Republic and was first elected in 2013.

    The current Czech constitution was adopted on October 19, 1992, and ratified on New Years Day 1993. The constitution stipulates that the Czech Republic is a  is a unitary parliamentary republic with three branches of government. The executive branch is headed by the President and the Prime Minister. The president is a formal head of state who has the power to return bills to the parliament, appoint members to the board of the Czech National Bank, nominate constitutional court judges for the Senate’s approval and dissolve the Chamber of Deputies under certain special and unusual circumstances. The president appoints the prime minister, as well as the other members of the cabinet on a proposal by the prime minister. The President serves a five-year term with no more than two consecutive terms and since 2013, is directly elected. The current President of the Czech Republic is Miloš Zeman, who was first elected in 2013 and (narrowly) re-elected in 2018 despite much opposition to his policies (he is considered to be the “Donald Trump” of the Czech Republic).

    Andrej Babiš is the current prime minister of the Czech Republic and has been in office since December of 2017.

    The Prime Minister of the Czech Republic is considered to be the head of government and holds considerable powers, such as the right to set the agenda for most foreign and domestic policy and choose government ministers. The current Prime Minister of the Czech Republic is Andrej Babiš, a member of the centrist  ANO 2011. He has served as Prime Minister since December 6, 2017. The Chamber of Deputies is the lower house of the Czech Parliament and its members are elected to a four-year term by proportional representation, with a 5% election threshold. The Senate members are elected in single-seat constituencies by two-round runoff voting for a six-year term, with one-third elected every even year in the autumn. The first election was in 1996, for differing terms.

    The judicial system of the Czech Republic follows the principle of civil law system based on the continental type, rooted in Germanic legal culture. The Czech court system includes district, county and supreme courts and is divided into civil, criminal, and administrative branches.  The Constitutional Court consists of 15 constitutional judges and oversees violations of the Constitution by either the legislature or by the government. The Supreme Court is formed of 67 judges and is the court of highest appeal for almost all legal cases heard in the Czech Republic. The Supreme Administrative Court decides on issues of procedural and administrative propriety. It also has jurisdiction over many political matters, such as the formation and closure of political parties, jurisdictional boundaries between government entities, and the eligibility of persons to stand for public office.

    Despite having a strong human rights record, the Czech Republic is currently undergoing protests over the EU refugee resettlement proposals.

    The Czech Republic has an overall strong record in the realm of human rights and political freedom and is considered to be a model for the former Soviet-bloc countries. Perhaps in response to abuses committed towards the Czech people during the periods of Nazi Germany and Soviet occupation, the Czech Republic takes an active role in protecting the rights of its citizens and is proud of its human rights record. Despite its overall positive record on human rights, the Czech Republic still faces some criticism by human rights organizations due to its refusal to participate in refugee resettlement programs put forward by the European Union and an increase in hate speech towards migrants from the Middle East. Additionally, governmental corruption has increased under the Presidency of Milos Zeman, thus increasing citizen alienation from the Czech political process.

    In terms of demographics, the Czech Republic is estimated to be 10.4% Roman Catholic, 1.1% Protestant, 54% unspecified/other, and 34.5% non-religious.  The main ethnic groups in the Czech Republic are Czech (64.3%), Moravian (5%), Slovak (1.4%), other (1.8%), and 27.5% unspecified, and the official languages of the country are Czech (spoken by ~95% of the population) and Slovak (spoken by ~2% of the population). The Czech Republic has a literacy rate of ~99% for both men and women and a life expectancy of 78.8 years (81.9 for women and 75.1 for men), comparable to the US and other European countries.

    The Czech Republic has a strong economy characterized by a stable currency, diverse industries, and a low unemployment rate.

    The  Czech Republic is has a GDP $372 billion (2017 estimate),  Human Development Index Score of 0.878 and a GINI Score of 25.9. The economy of the Czech Republic is primarily service-based (59.7%), with industry and agriculture making up 37.8% and 2.5% of total economic output respectively. The unemployment rate of the Czech Republic is estimated to be around 3% as of 2017 and GDP per capita is $35,200. The Czech Republic currently has the lowest unemployment rate in the European Union and its currency is one of the strongest performing currencies of 2017. Despite its strong economic performance in recent years, the Czech economies dependence on exports makes economic growth vulnerable to contractions in external demand.

    In the realm of foreign policy, the Czech Republic is an active member of organizations such as the UN, European Union, NATO, and is an observer in the Organization of American States. The Czech Republic has diplomatic ties with a majority of countries and has sought to establish a positive reputation as a mediator in diplomatic disputes currently going on in Europe. Historically, the Czech Republic has had a tense relationship with both Germany and Russia due to the latter two countries attempts to limit Czech sovereignty and gain influence within both Czech domestic and foreign policy. In recent years, the Czech Republic has improved its diplomatic ties with Germany and have developed close economic ties. On the other hand, Czech-Russian relations soured to a point since Vladimir Putin began his third term in 2012. The Czech Republic strongly opposed the Russian-intervention in Ukraine and supports the ongoing EU sanctions against Russia.

    In conclusion, the Czech Republic continues to remain one of the more stable countries within the European Union due to its strong economy, democratic society, and positive role in foreign affairs. Geopolitical issues remain minimal within the country and its future outlook remains strong in the face of emerging challenges such as a resurgent Russia, declines in US support for Europe, and the EU refugee crisis.

  • Theories of Democratic Transitions: “The Civic Culture”

    Theories of Democratic Transitions: “The Civic Culture”

    In the book “The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, An Analytic Study,” Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba present a study of the political culture of democracy and discuss the social structures and processes that help to improve its overall stability. A common concern among political scientists is the future of democracy at the global level. In the years following World War II, events such as de-colonialization have raised some questions about the long-term stability of Democratic political systems and placed the issue into the broader context of the world’s culture. Despite the fact that Almond and Verba feel that the direction of political change at the global level is unclear, they argue that a political culture based upon individual participation will emerge due to demands by ordinary citizens. Additionally, Almond and Verba propose that the emerging nations will be presented with two different models of the participatory state, the democratic and totalitarian models of participation. The democratic model of participation offers the ordinary man the opportunity to take part in the political decision-making process as an influential citizen, whereas the totalitarian offers him the role of the “participant subject.” Both the democratic and totalitarian models of participation have appealed to emerging nations, but it is unclear which one will ultimately win.

    According to Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, the democratic model of participation will require more than the introduction of formal institutions of democracy such as freedom of speech, an elected legislature, and universal suffrage. A participatory democratic system also requires a consistent political culture. On the other hand, Almond and Verba argue that there are several problems with transferring democratic political culture to emerging nations. The first issue is that many of the leaders in developing states have little experience with the working principles of democratic policy and civic cultures such as political parties, interest groups, and electoral systems. As a result, the idea of democratic policy as conveyed to the leaders of new countries is incomplete and heavily stresses ideology and legal norms as opposed to conveying the actual feeling and attitude towards democratic ideals. A further reason why the diffusion of democracy to new nations is difficult is that they are confronted with structural problems. For example, many of the new nations are entering the global stage at a time in which they have not fully developed industrially. As a result, individual leaders may be drawn to a policy in which authoritarian bureaucracy promotes industrial development and technological advancement, and where political organization becomes a device for human and social engineering.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba then go on to discuss the idea of the civic culture. The civic culture is a mixed set of values that contains attributes from both modern and traditional cultures and allows them to interact and interchange without polarizing and destroying each other. Additionally, Almond and Verba describe the civic culture as pluralistic and based on communication and persuasion, consensus, diversity, and accessibility to gradual political change. Almond and Verba then explore the development of civic culture in Great Britain. One of the circumstances that resulted in the creation of a modern society in Britain was the emergence of a thriving merchant class and the involvement of the court and aristocracy in economic decisions. Moreover, the English Reformation and the increasing prevalence of religious diversity resulted in a higher level of secularization within British society, leading to greater modernization. As a consequence of both factors, Britain entered the 18th Century with independent merchants and aristocrats who established a parliamentary system that made it possible to assimilate rapid social changes without any sharp discontinuities. By establishing a civic culture, ordinary people were able to enter into the political process and develop British democratic structures.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba describe several different types of political cultures. According to Almond and Verba, political culture refers to the overall attitudes that individuals have regarding the political system and their attitudes toward their respective roles in the system. The term political culture is used because it allows Almond and Verba to separate the non-political concepts from their study and allows them to employ an interdisciplinary approach to their analysis of mass attitudes towards democracy. In classifying objects of political orientation, Almond and Verba start with the general political system, which deals with the organization as a whole. In explaining the components of the political system, Almond and Verba distinguish the specific roles or structures, the functions of incumbents, and particular public policies, decisions, or enforcement of decisions. These structures, incumbents, and decisions are then classified by involvement either in the political (input) process, or in the administrative (output) process.

    In their study of mass attitudes and values, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have identified three distinct types of political cultures. The first type of political culture mentioned by Almond and Verba is the parochial political culture. A parochial political culture emerges when the citizens of a particular nation have no understanding of the national political system, do not possess any tendency to participate in the input processes and have no consciousness of the output operations. Additionally, there are no specialized political roles within a parochial political culture, and the leadership roles are not separated from their religious and social orientations. Examples of parochial political cultures include African and Native American tribes and indigenous communities within particular nations. A subjective political culture is when people are aware of the mechanism of government and the political process, but are not taught to or are not allowed to participate in the system. Examples of subjective political cultures include traditional monarchies or authoritarian government systems. In a participant political culture, the populace is involved in the decision-making process and more or less has a say in public policy decisions. Examples of participant political cultures include the United States, Great Britain, and many other countries throughout the world. The three different classifications of political culture described by Almond and Verba does not assume that one classification replaces the other. On the other hand, the introduction of new classifications serves as a way to encourage previous political orientations to adapt.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba also mention that a number of political cultures are systematically mixed. A systematically mixed political culture occurs when there are elements of more simple and more complex patterns of political orientations. The first example of a systematically mixed political culture is the parochial-subject culture, which occurs when a majority of the population has rejected the exclusive claims of diffuse tribal, village, or feudal authority and has developed allegiance towards more complex political systems. Examples of parochial-subject political cultures include the Ottoman Empire and the loosely articulated African kingdoms. In a subject-participant culture, a substantial part of the population has acquired the ability and desire to become more engaged in governmental decisions, whereas the rest of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian political structure and have a relatively little desire to get involved in critical public policy decisions. Additionally, a successful shift from a subject to a participant culture requires the diffusion of positive orientations toward a democratic infrastructure, the acceptance of norms of civic obligation, and the development of a sense of civic competence among a substantial proportion of the population. France during the 19th Century and Germany during the early 20th Century are examples of subject-participant political cultures. A parochial-participant political culture occurs when elements of a participatory system are introduced to a traditionally parochial society. As a result of the lack of structure and experiences with democracy, parochial-participant political cultures have the most experiences with instability and teeter back and forth between democracy and authoritarianism.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba focus on the political cultures of five different countries in their study: The United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Almond and Verba selected these countries because they have experienced a wide range of historical and political experiences and have gone through a number of events that influenced their political systems. The United States and Great Britain both represent relatively successful experiments in democratic governance despite the fact that the rationale behind their acceptance of democratic values is different. For example, the political culture in Great Britain combines deference toward authority with a lively sense of the rights of citizen initiatives, whereas the political culture of the United States is based on political competence and participation rather than obedience to legitimate authority. Germany is included because its experiments in democratic governance during the late 19th and early 20th Century never resulted in the development of a participatory political culture necessary to legitimize democratic institutions of government. Almond and Verba include Italy and Mexico in their study because both represent less developed societies with transitional political systems.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba then go on to discuss the feelings towards government and politics that are prevalent in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. The first metric that they measured was the national factors in which the resident of all five countries were most proud of. A majority (85%) of American respondents cited their political system as the greatest source of pride they feel towards their country. In contrast, only 46% of British, 30% of Mexican, 7% of German, and 3% of Italian respondents cited their governmental institutions as their greatest source of national pride. Moreover, American and British respondents were more likely to refer to public policy accomplishments than the respondents from other countries. The Italian respondents cited their countries contributions to the arts and its cultural treasures, whereas the German respondents cited their countries economic system as the greatest source of national pride. Additionally, Mexican pride was distributed equally between the political and economic systems and the physical attributes of their country.

    The findings show that the Americans and British express great pride in their political institutions and thus feel the least alienated towards their political systems. On the other hand, the Germans and Italian respondents express a low level of pride in their political institutions and feel more alienated towards their governments. The results from the Mexican respondents show that they have a keen interest in political involvement despite the fact that their political culture is largely parochial. The fact that Mexican respondents expressed an interest in politics is due to past feelings associated by the populace with events such as the Mexican Revolution. The continued connection to the Mexican Revolution shows that the Mexican people believe that the revolution did not accomplish its stated political goals and that the process of political change is ongoing. When broken down by educational level, a majority of American, British, and Mexican respondents with higher levels of education expressed more pride in their respective political systems. Additionally, the fact that educational attainment does no influence the levels of national pride among the German and Italian respondents further suggests alienation from the political system as opposed to a lack of awareness of the system.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba also go on to explore the expectation of treatment by governmental authorities among the respondents from all five countries. Both Almond and Verba hypothesized that if the respondents expected fair treatment by governmental authorities, they would, in turn, express more support for legitimate authority. The respondents from the United States, Great Britain, and Germany expected a higher level of treatment by governmental authorities than the respondents from Italy and Mexico. Additionally, the expectation of treatment by governmental authorities varies by educational attainment. For example, respondents from the United States, Great Britain, and Germany with higher educational levels expect more equitable treatment by political authorities than respondents with lower levels of education. Even though the number of Italian and Mexican respondents expecting fair and equal treatment in government were relatively low, the differences between the advantaged and less advantaged groups regarding education were larger than in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. Such findings show that there is a connection between expectations regarding treatment by governmental authorities and alienation from the political system.

    The attitudes towards political communication are also discussed by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. A key component of democratic governments is the willingness for ordinary men and women to get involved in the political process. The main factor that influences such willingness is the level of comfort with discussing political issues. Respondents from the United States and Great Britain expressed the highest level of willingness to discuss politics. Additionally, even though German respondents expressed the highest frequency of following reports about public affairs, the number of people who discuss politics on a regular basis was lower than in the United States and Great Britain. On the other hand, the Mexican and Italian respondents expressed a relatively low willingness to discuss political affairs. With regards to the percent of respondents who refused to report their voting decision, the American, British, and Mexican respondents expressed little reluctance when revealing their political choice, whereas the German and Italian respondents expressed the highest level of reluctance. The reluctance on the part of the German and Italian respondents to reveal their voting choices shows that they feel that identifying with a political party is unsafe and inadvisable. Additionally, their unwillingness to reveal their voting choices indicates that there is a higher level of alienation from the political system on the part of the German and Italian respondents when compared to the American, British, and Mexican respondents.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba then discuss the relationship between the civic culture and democratic stability and the impact of political culture on the political system that it belongs to. One view that Almond and Verba discuss is the rationality-activist model, which stipulates that a stable democracy involves the population to be informed and active in politics. Additionally, the rationality-activist model requires the citizens to base their voting choices on careful evaluation and carefully weighing in the alternatives. On the other hand, Almond and Verba mention that current research shows that most citizens in democratic nations rarely live up to the rationality-activist model. As such, Almond and Verba feel that the rationality-activist model is only a part of the civic culture and does not make up its entirety. Moreover, Almond and Verba describe the civic culture as a mixed political culture that involves both citizens who are informed and take an active role in politics and citizens who take a less active role in politics. The diverse nature of the civic culture also implies that the different roles in political such as parochial, subject, and participant do not replace each other and instead build upon each other.

    In conclusion, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba discuss the idea of the political culture and its relationship to democracy in “The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, An Analytic Study.” A major concern among political scientists is what factors result in the establishment of a political culture that allows for the stability of democracy within a particular country. In their study of political culture, Almond and Verba looked at several factors such as citizen views on government, views on treatment by governmental authorities, and the willingness of people to discuss political issues and the views that respondents from five different democracies have regarding them. The results of their study determined that countries with a long-term history of democratic governance were more likely to have political cultures that foster democratic ideas than countries with a shorter history of democratic government. Additionally, Almond and Verba discuss the relationship between political culture and the long-term stability of democratic political systems.

  • Theories of Democratic Transitions

    In the study of Democratic Transitions and regime collapse at the international level, there exist many theories that can be used to help explain the individual factors behind democratization. For example, some theories on democratization focus on the role that economic and social development plays in increasing support for democratic change. On the other hand, others concentrate on the political cultures present in democracy and discuss the social structures and processes that help to enhance overall stability. Different ideas on democratization vary in their effectiveness and may not be applied uniformly.

    Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba explored attitudes towards democracy in countries including the US, Mexico, the UK, Italy, and Germany
    Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba explored attitudes towards democracy in countries including the US, Mexico, the UK, Italy, and Germany

    The first theory of democratization is that of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. As initially illustrated in the 1963 book “The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, An Analytic Study,” Almond and Verba explore the relationship between political culture and democracy by studying the overall values and attitudes of five different countries. Almond and Verba first discuss the idea of the civic culture, which is a mixed set of values that contains attributes from both modern and traditional cultures and allows both cultures to interact polarizing and destroying each other. Further, Almond and Verba identify three different types of political cultures. These categories include parochial political culture, subjective political cultures, and participatory political cultures. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba then discuss the relationship between the civic culture and democratic stability and the impact of political culture on political systems to which they belong.

    One such view that Almond and Verba explore is the rationality-activist model, which stipulates that a stable democracy requires the population to be informed and active in politics. The rationality-activist model also requires citizens to base their voting choices on careful evaluation and weighing in alternatives. Almond and Verba determine that most citizens in democratic nations do not live up to the rationality-activist model based on their research. As such, Almond and Verba feel that the rationality-activist model is one component of, and does not explain all of, civic culture. Moreover, Almond and Verba discuss the civic culture as a mixed political culture that includes both citizens who are familiarized and take an active role in politics and citizens who take a less active role in politics.

    Dankwart Rustow explores an entirely different theory of which factors result in democratization and ensure that democracy will remain stable. In his 1970 article “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a dynamic model,” Rustow argues that a dynamic model for democratic transitions is necessary to explain such processes in individual nations and that standardized approaches to democratization often ignore the factors that vary between countries. As opposed to theorists such as Almond and Verba, Rustow argues for a genetic theory on democratization, comparing evolution to democratization. Like natural selection, the possibility that instability may permit authoritarian regimes to adapt to democratization and that their beliefs may adjust over time. Dankwart Rustow’s model of democratization is based on four different stages. The first stage is the background condition, which starts out with national unity as its primary condition. The next phase is the preparatory phase, which consists of the political processes that set democratization off. In the decision stage, democracy is achieved through a process of a conscious action on the part of the top political leadership. The habituation phase institutes a process of selectivity for people who are supporters of democracy, among parties in general elections and politicians vying for leadership within these parties.

    The theory on democratization by Seymour Lipsett focuses on the relationship between economic development and the likelihood of a country to become and remain a stable democracy. In the 1959 article “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development,” Lipsett hypothesizes that the more developed a country is in terms of economics, it is more likely that the country would be a democracy and be characterized by a more stable political situation overall. For his study, Lipsett looks at a number of countries in both Latin America and Europe and uses several different indices such as per capita income, education levels, the percent of a countries population employed in the agricultural sector, and urbanization. Even though the indices were presented separately, they point in favor of Seymour Lipsett’s initial hypothesis that democracy and the level of development within societies are interconnected and show that if a country is more economically developed, the chances for the emergence of a democratic political system is much higher than for underdeveloped countries. Lipsett’s study also suggests that the first step in modernization is urbanization, which is followed by media growth and literacy. The next stage is rapid industrial development, which fosters improved communication networks. The growth of advanced communication networks, in turn, encourages the development of formal democratic institutions such as voting and citizen participation in the decisions of their government.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman look at the effects of socioeconomic forces in transitions to democracy in the article “The political economy of democratic transitions.” Haggard and Kaufman focus on the effects of short-term economic conditions on the bargaining power and interests of incumbents and opposition. Drawing upon the experiences of ten middle-income Latin American and Asian countries, they trace the impact of economic crisis on the terms of democratic transitions and the nature of new political alignments. Haggard and Kaufman argue that elite bargaining is an element in democratic transitions. When such strategic interactions are put in the wider socioeconomic context, it is clear that there are significant policy dilemmas, political alignments of new democratic governments, and longer-term prospects for stability and consolidation.

    Haggard and Kaufman argue that even though social interests and relations do not determine prospects for democracy, political elites can mobilize support or opposition in new democracies depending on how economic policy affects the distribution of income across different social groups. Moreover, economic performance over time changes preferences about democratic institutions, particular policies, and incumbents. Furthermore, Haggard and Kaufman state that the connection between the policies of new democratic governments and the long-term prospects for solidification must be addressed with caution. Consolidation, according to Haggard and Kaufman, is affected by political choices that modify the initial terms of the transition in addition to international and domestic developments out of the control of political leaders.

    John Higley and Michael Burton argue that the decisions by societal elites play a role in democratic transitions regime breakdowns in their 1989 article “The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns.” Higley and Burton state that democratic transitions and breakdowns can be understood by studying changes in the internal relations of national elites. The first type of national elite that they discuss is the disunified national elite, which produces a series of unstable regimes that tend to alternate between authoritarian and democratic on a regular basis. On the other hand, consensually unified elite results in a much more stable governmental system that has the potential to evolve into a stable democracy if socioeconomic conditions permit.

    According to Higley and Burton, elite disunity stems from the process of nation-state formation. The construction of new states is typically a complicated process characterized by violence and conflict. Additionally, elite disunity involves the repression of certain elite groups by others, which makes disunity inevitable. A disunified elite may cause political instability and leave an opportunity for outside forces to overthrow the regime. Elite transformations, according to Higley and Burton, occur in two steps. In the first step, various factions enter into voluntary collaboration in electoral politics to mobilize a solid electoral majority and protect their interests by controlling government executive power. In the second step, the primary hostile factions opposing this coalition eventually abandon their ideological stances and adopt those of the winning coalition. As a result of this development, a consensually unified national elite is created, and a stable democratic regime typically emerges.

    Adam Przeworski looks at the economic conditions that allow democracy to be consolidated in the 1991 book “Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America.” In his work, Przeworski attempts to identify the obstacles in building lasting democracy and transforming poor economies in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Przeworski charts the paths along which countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe from a political and economic organization. Przeworski looks at the way outcomes are enforced under a democratic system and offers several different views of compliance within the system. He determines compliance exists in the form of self-enforcing outcomes, bargains, and contracts, or as individual motivation to social order. According to Przeworski, Democracy becomes consolidated when either it becomes the only viable option for a particular set of political and economic circumstances or when all the relevant political forces find it best to submit their interests and values to the interplay of the democratic institutions. Przeworski’s hypothesis is based on three different assumptions. The first two assumptions are that the role of institutions is important in a democratic system and that there are various ways in which democracies are established. The third assumption is that institutions make a difference in efficiency of government as well as in the distribution of wealth.

    In the book “Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states,” Albert Hirschman explores how organizations discern their wrongdoings and come back to the right track. Regardless of how well the core institutions are set up in society, it is presumed that individual members will fail to live up to the rules. Hirschman states that every society learns to live with a certain amount of this form of dysfunction, but that they must learn to correct such transgressions. Hirschman then goes on to discuss the ideas of exit and voice of the public. Individuals who run firms or organizations find out about their wrongdoings through two different routes. The first route is the exit path, which occurs when customers stop purchasing a firm’s products or leave an organization. As a result of the exit, a firm’s revenues may drop or membership to an organization begins to decline, thus convincing the leadership to correct any inefficiencies that led to the exit. The next route is the voice option, which occurs when either the customers or the members of an organization begin to express their dissatisfaction directly to the leadership of an organization or firm. As a result, the leadership engages in a search to discover and correct the factors that resulted in its constituents’ dissatisfaction. The exit route is connected to economics because it consists of a client who is displeased with a product using the market to defend their position. On the other hand, the voice route is related to politics because it serves as a way to convince organizations and firms to change their policies or be replaced by democratic competition.

    The strongest theoretical approach to democratization, in my opinion, is that Dankwart Rustow. The primary reason why this approach is the strongest is that it takes into account the fact that various countries have different experiences regarding their political history and the development of formal societal institutions. The variations in development and history often play a role in determining the steps that a country takes to move towards democracy and the overall stability of the democratic government when it does emerge. Additionally, Rustows approach takes into account the fact that instability may result in an authoritarian leader modifying their views to allow for a greater level of democracy and political freedom. Another strength of Rustow’s theory on democratization is that it begins with national unity as the key factor that allows for democratic governments to eventually gain power. A common theme in many democratic transitions is that demands among the vast majority of citizens for democratic change are a key factor that allowed for democratic governments to gain power and legitimacy. Additionally, national unity often serves as a way to increase the overall stability and long-term survival prospects of democratic regimes.

    The approach by Haggard and Kaufman is the second strongest theoretical approach to democratization. The main reason as to why the assumption by Haggard and Kaufman is the second most reliable approach is because they take into the fact that there exist two different types of democratic transitions, the crisis, and non-crisis transition. The crisis transition occurs when a country is faced with an economic decline, whereas non-crisis transitions occur when there is relative economic stability in a country. Haggard and Kaufman make a convincing argument that transitions to democracy are often dependent on the economic circumstances that a country is facing. For example, they state that countries that are economically stable are less likely to transition towards democracy, whereas countries facing economic uncertainty have a greater chance to see the decline in authoritarianism. The examples that they use in their cause study also show a high level of variation between both the crisis and non-crisis transitions. Additionally, the cases they include represent a diverse geographic array of countries located in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. The fact that they focus on countries in various geographic areas shows that their hypothesis that economic circumstances play a role in democratic transitions can be applied to many different scenarios and that is not dependent on particular geographic regions.

    The third strongest approach is by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. The main strength of Almond and Verba’s approach is that it takes into account the belief that democracy in a country is dependent on the creation of a values system that is supportive of it. Without the existence of a system of values that allows for democracy and widespread citizen participation in politics, the future stability and strength of any democratic political systems is reduced. Additionally, a values system in which individuals are accustomed to the ideas of democracy is widespread, the more likely that democracy will eventually emerge within an authoritarian political system. The primary weakness with Almond and Verba’s approach is that it only takes into account five different countries. Out of the five countries, they mention, the ones with the strongest history of democratic governance are the United States and Great Britain. Germany and Italy, on the other hand, were characterized by political instability and a relatively short history of democratic institutions Moreover, Mexico at the time of Almond and Verba’s study was marked as having a one-party political system and limited political freedom overall.

    The fourth strongest theoretical approach to democratization is by Albert Hirschman. The reason why the democratization model of Albert Hirschman is the fourth strongest is that it focuses on the role of individuals in determining political change. Hirschman’s approach is based on the idea that people will either voice their dissatisfaction with the status quo and push authoritarian leaders to implement policies that allow for greater governmental efficiency or a higher level of political freedom, or exit from the current political situation and begin supporting alternative political systems such as democracy. Additionally, Hirschman argues that the ability for individuals to voice their opinions in an authoritarian society is based on the existence of exit options and the opportunity for members to shift towards competing political ideas. The approach by Hirschman also looks at the notion of gradual political reform by taking into account the possibility that efforts by individuals may force leaders into making lasting political changes. On the other hand, Hirschman does not take into consideration the fact that authoritarian leaders may not have the incentive to allow for gradual reform even with increasing demands from individuals. For example, authoritarian leaders may still be willing to keep the current political status quo in spite of increased citizen demands for change due to the existence of longstanding structural and institutional factors.

    The fifth strongest approach to democratic transitions is by Adam Przeworski. The reason why the approach to Adam Przeworski is the fifth strongest is that it presents an in-depth view as to how outcomes are followed through in a democratic political system and how democracy becomes consolidated. Additionally, Przeworski looks at the underlying problems associated with democratic transitions and the dynamic between various elements within an authoritarian society. Understanding the issues defining democratic transitions and the number of factions in an authoritarian society is essential to having an understanding regarding how authoritarian countries ultimately transition to democracy. Moreover, Przeworski takes into account several different outcomes that societies tend to take regarding democratic transitions that are often ignored by other theorists. The main weakness of Przeworski’s approach is that he primarily focuses on economic factors and tends to ignore political and social factors and the ways in which they influence a countries transition towards democracy.

    The sixth strongest model of democratization is by John Higley and Michael Burton. Higley and Burton look into the relationship between societal elites and democratization. The reason why such approach is valid is that elites have often played a significant role in pushing for democratization and have a role in determining the long-term success of democratic systems. Additionally, the approach of Higley and Burton focuses on the outcomes of democratic transitions, which serves as a contrast to the approach of other democracy theorists who mostly explore the processes behind democratic transitions. The main weakness of Higley and Burton’s democratization theory is that it assumes that the relationships of societal elites are the primary factor that influences democratic stability in society. Additionally, they argue that elite disunity is the main factor that creates political instability and does not take into account other factors such as economic uncertainty, ongoing societal issues, and political struggle in creating instability and weakening the effectiveness of new democratic governments.

    The seventh strongest idea on democratization is by Seymour Lipsett. The main strength of Lipsett’s approach is that he used quantitative methods to explore how democracy emerges as opposed to the previous theoretical approaches used by previous theorists. Additionally, Lipsett looks at the emergence of democracy through both a sociological as well as economic perspective. The main weakness in Lipsett’s approach is the fact that he does not use a varied group of countries within his study. For example, Lipsett only includes countries from Latin America and Europe as his case studies. The fact that he uses a relatively small subset of countries limits the effectiveness of his research and prevents the data that he finds from being applied uniformly. Additionally, the methodology that Lipsett used to classify countries as being a democracy or not is questionable and is not uniform between both regions that he focuses his study on. For example, the main criteria Lipsett uses to locate European democracies are the uninterrupted continuation of democracy since World War One, and the absence of any significant political movement opposed to liberal ideas since the mid-1930s. He categorizes Latin American democracies by the level of freedom in political elections since the end of World War One. The relatively limited nature of his classifications does not take into account other factors that influence democracies such as overall political freedom.

    In conclusion, political scientists and governmental leaders alike often ask the question as to what factors allow democracy to form and flourish in particular societies. To explain the factors that lead to democratization and the stability of a democratic system, there exist several different democratization theories. The theories of democratization often vary in their effectiveness and focus on the various aspects such as the economic, political, and social factors behind democratic transitions. Additionally, the theories of democratic transitions often concentrate on certain areas of the world more than others and sometimes are only applicable to the period in which they were initially developed in. Despite the differences between the theories of democratization, a common theme they share is that they promote the belief that countries will eventually turn towards democracy and that more open political systems will ultimately emerge.

  • Breaking News NJ Democratic Election Winner

    Breaking News NJ Democratic Election Winner

    Breaking News the Democratic Primary winner is Phil Murphy. After a long tough race, Murphy outspending all of his appoints by millions managed to skate by with an election victory. John Money-Pants Johnson was at the scene, “I thought he wasn’t going to be able to buy the election, we were really scared. But thanks to the American election system we won fair and square with millions of dollars.”

    Phil Murphy A smile that could bite your head off
    Phil Murphy a smile that could bite your head off

    Phil Murphy Wall Street Executive, Gold Man Sachs Whore, fonderly off all things money, spent 20 million dollars to win the Democratic Primary. A wallet so thick it will make your head spin and your pants fall off.
    John Money-Pants Johnson, a well-known supporter of Murphy, left with their campaign slogan going forward” Phil Murphy, Money, Power and Screwing the Public. Yes, WE can.”

    Kim Guadagno the Republican Nominee lagged far behind spending only 8 million dollars to rob her primary away from whoever else was in there.
    This year’s election seems to be the race to see who can burn as much money as possible while chanting “Fuck the Poor”. It’s going to be an interesting race folks. Murphy has an advantage with his stacks of cash being much higher.Microphones will be distributed. It’s noteworthy to say you should not underestimate the resolve of a Republican woman who is more than ready to put on a strap on and literally fuck the poor. Back to you Matt.

    http://www.njpen.com/2017-primary-election-results-no-surprises-low-turnout/ (less then 20% of NJ Registers Democrats or Republicans Voted)

    NJ Gov Race: Murphy Passes $20M in Spending


    http://www.kimfornj.com/on_the_issues
    https://www.murphy4nj.com/issues

  • The Elite Variable in Democracy

    John Higley and Michael Burton argue that the decisions by societal elites play a role in democratic transitions regime breakdowns in their 1989 article “The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns.” Higley and Burton state that democratic transitions and breakdowns can be understood by studying changes in the internal relations of national elites. The first type of national elite that they discuss is the disunified national elite, which produces a series of unstable regimes that tend to alternate between authoritarian and democratic on a regular basis. On the other hand, a consensually unified elite results in a much more stable governmental system that has the potential to evolve into a stable democracy if socioeconomic conditions permit.

    According to Higley and Burton, elite disunity stems from the process of nation-state formation. The construction of new states is typically a complicated process characterized by violence and conflict. Additionally, elite disunity involves the repression of certain elite groups by others, which makes disunity inevitable. A disunified elite may cause political instability and leave an opportunity for outside forces to overthrow the regime.

    Elite transformations, according to Higley and Burton, occur in two steps. In the first step, various factions enter into voluntary collaboration in electoral politics to mobilize a solid electoral majority and protect their interests by controlling government executive power. In the second step, the primary hostile factions opposing this coalition eventually abandon their ideological stances and adopt those of the winning coalition. As a result of this development, a consensually unified national elite is created, and a stable democratic regime typically emerges.

    This article is a response to “The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns,” by John Highley and Michael Burton. It is found at: https://www.scribd.com/document/73166207/HIGLEY-BURTON-The-Elite-Variable-in-Democratic-Transitions-and-Breakdowns

  • “The political economy of democratic transitions” Response

    “The political economy of democratic transitions” Response

    In the article “The political economy of democratic transitions,” Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman explore the effects of socioeconomic factors on democracy. Since the early 1970s, articles by Dankwart Rustow on democratic transitions have been reference consistently by experts. Rustow analyzed the socioeconomic, political, and psychological prerequisites of democracy. Democratization is the result of regime change, among numerous other factors. Most contemporary theories of democratization do not specify the resources that contending parties bring to negotiation and do not consider what is at stake for those involved. In contrast, the approach by Kaufman and Haggard examines the leverage of incumbents against the opposition. Additionally, they look at ten middle-income countries in Latin America and Asia to better explain where democracy came from.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman start in the 1970s. Guillermo O’Donnell argued that economic changes create issues and incentives for militaries and individuals to abandon democracy and turn to authoritarianism. Additionally, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (other theorists) instead argued that electoral institutions increased polarization (such as the recent Clinton-Trump Presidential divide). Both Linz and Stephan argue that polarization is a reflection of a failure of democratic leadership.

    The collapse of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s increased interest in democratic transitions. During this period, politicians were influenced by Rustow’s emphasis on strategic interaction and negotiation. For example, after the Cold War, a number of new democracies throughout Europe due to these strategic negotiations.

    The approach by Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman focuses on the effects of economic circumstances on the preferences, resources, and strategies of the most important political actors in democratic transitions. In addition, they recognize that many factors contributed to the democratic transformations of the 1980s and 1990s such as diplomatic pressures, structural changes associated with long-term economic development, and the spread of democratization within neighboring countries Moreover, Haggard and Kaufman argue that there is no relationship between regime change and economic crises.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman go over the responses to the economic crises by authoritarian regimes. The financial crises of the 1970s and 1980s were far reaching and cut across all social classes, necessitating policy reform. Kaufman and Haggard argue that poor economic performance reduces the power of authoritarian leaders. Economic declines such as the 2008 Great Recession alter the status quo between governments and the private sector. Cooperation between private sector business groups and authoritarian rulers is crucial for the stability of authoritarian rule. If the private sector loses confidence in the ability of the government to manage the economy, businesses begin supporting opposition groups. In contrast, even though authoritarian regimes may decline in periods of weaker economic growth, they have greater power in a stronger economy because of public dissatisfaction.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman go on to further support their arguments by comparing transitions from military rule in ten different countries. The six crisis transitions the look at include Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, the Philippines, Brazil, and Peru. The regime transitions in Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and the Philippines occurred during economic downturns. Even though the transition in Brazil occurred during economic recovery, it experienced severe economic shocks several years earlier and still continued to face a series of unresolved adjustment challenges at the time of their respective transitions. The four non-crisis transitions they examine are Chile, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey. The authoritarian governments in these transitions withdrew due to a variety of international and domestic political pressures. Additionally, the transitions in each country occurred against the backdrop of strong economic growth and economic stability. These conditions help to account for variations in the terms of the transition and the political alignments that emerged under new democratic regime.

    The first area that Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman look at is the terms of the transitions in both the crisis and non-crisis scenarios. One area in which the differences between the crisis and non-crisis cases exists is through the processes through which constitutional orders were written and implemented. In Chile, Turkey, and Thailand, the transitions occurred under constitutions drafted by the outgoing authoritarian government. Even though incoming opposition political leaders succeeded in including some amendments, these constitutions provided the framework in which new democratic governments operated. On the other hand, opposition forces held much greater influence during crisis transitions. Their influence was particularly strong in the Philippines and Argentina. In such cases, opposition political leaders made choices with little input from the outgoing government and returned to the constitutions in effect prior to authoritarian rule. The relative strength of authoritarian and opposition forces in the negotiation process also influenced governmental design. The two objectives of outgoing authoritarian rulers were to preserve the military’s organizational autonomy and to impose limits on the opposition.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman then go over the fact that outgoing authoritarian political leaders often create authoritarian enclaves in the noncrisis transitions. The main authoritarian enclave set up by the outgoing authoritarian rulers was the military. For example, Thailand’s military continued to be a dominant force in its political system despite the country’s transition towards democracy and Pinochet remained as the commander of the Chilean military after he stepped down from power in 1990. Additionally, civilian oversight of the Turkish army remained limited after its transition to democracy in 1983. On the other hand, economic difficulties and loss of support prevented outgoing leaders from preserving either military prerogatives or other means of political influence in the crisis scenario. In the case of the Philippines, the military provided crucial support for the democratic transition and thus had considerable support within the new democratic government. Additionally, the Brazilian military retained the most extensive institutional rights of any military among the crisis transitions but left office constrained by deep internal divisions and a decline in support among both politicians and the general public. As a result, its influence on the new Brazilian constitution is relatively limited when compared to a number of non-crisis transitions such as Chile and Turkey.

    Restrictions on political participation is another way in which both the non-crisis and crisis scenarios vary. In the non-crisis transitions, mechanisms of exclusion range from bans on political activity and outright repression to subtle manipulation of electoral laws. Exclusionary mechanisms were most visible in Turkey. For example, the government used legal restrictions on Islamic fundamentalism to clamp down on press freedom. The main labor confederation also remained banned after the transition in 1983 and the government sought to persecute union activists. Moreover, the Turkish military also banned numerous political organizations. On the other hand, the elimination of restrictions on labor and political groups was much more evident in the crisis cases. For example, labor unions regained the right to organize, strike, and press their political demands in countries such as Bolivia and many of the countries characterized by crisis transitions implemented open electoral laws that resulted in the development of strong multi-party political systems.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman also explore the political economy of new democracies. Even though both Haggard and Kaufman reject the notion that social interests determine the prospects for democracy, they recognize that the opportunities for political elites to mobilize support is dependent on how economic policy affects the distribution of income across different social groups. The first important factor that Haggard and Kaufman note is that the economic legacy of authoritarian rule determines the policy agenda of democratic successors. New democratic governments that come to power in the wake of crises confront a difficult set of economic policy choices. New democratic leaders can often trade political gains for short-run economic losses, but the transition itself raises expectations that government will respond to new political challenges. Additionally, policy reform is difficult because economic problems are pressing and demands for short-term economic relief are widespread. Economic evidence from middle income developing countries provides broad support for these expectations. For example, average budget deficits were almost twice the level of the pre-transition period, whereas in the noncrisis cases deficits remained low. Moreover, four of the crisis cases (Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru) experienced hyperinflation during their first democratic governments.

    In the noncrisis transitions, new democratic governments faced a different agenda of policy reforms. Even though economic reform was less pressing, even the most economically successful authoritarian governments were faced with societal issues that could erupt under democratic rule. Among the noncrisis transitions, the consequences of a large social deficit were most evident in Turkey, where inequality grew steadily during the 1980s. Despite such challenges, many of the countries that experienced non-crisis transitions made headway. For example, Chile’s democratic government had some success in reducing poverty and allowing for increased economic equality while maintaining strong economic growth throughout the 1990s. On the other hand, the continuing power of interests linked to the old regime placed limits on the extent to which the new democratic governments could adequately address the economic demands of previously excluded social groups.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman also argue that the transition paths also affect the evolution of the political institutions by which economic demands and policy dilemmas are addressed. In the non-crisis cases, new democratic governments often had to deal with the persistence of nondemocratic enclaves, the autonomy of the military establishment, and links between political groups and business elites. Efforts to address political legacies risked to unravel the democratic bargain and make the respective societies more at risk to return to authoritarianism. On the other hand, the crisis cases exhibited a different set of institutional dilemmas. The overall economic circumstances encouraged executives to concentrate their authority. Such a pattern has been evident where economic issues require complex stabilization packages. Divergent forces within the party system also increased the difficulty of sustaining support and strengthened the incentives for executives to govern in an autocratic manner. Democratic institutions may also be undermined by a failure to take swift and effective action in the cases of severe economic crises. However, the absence of institutionalized consultation with legislators and interest groups deprives executives of needed feedback that may be essential to correct past policy errors.

    In conclusion, Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman explore the impact of economic crises on democratic transitions in “The political economy of democratic transitions.” Their case study includes several different countries from Latin America and Asia and focuses on factors such as economic performance and the types of transitions towards democracy in each country. Through their study of the experiences of each country, Haggard and Kaufman conclude that economic policy and performance serves as a way to influence both transitions towards democracy and the future success of newly established democracies.