Category: Comparative Politics

  • Soldiers: Desertion, Rebellion, and the Philosophy of the Refusal to Fight

    Soldiers: Desertion, Rebellion, and the Philosophy of the Refusal to Fight

    Throughout human history, war has often been a method for different governments, nation-states, as well as organizations, to control resources. These wars have become bloodier and more collectivized over the last 150 years. What do I mean by collectivized? The entire population is gearing up to destroy another nation and now legitimately the enemy of another “nation.” Carl Von Clausewitz’s theory of “Total War” reshaped warfare starting in the 1800s. Total war is defined as “war that is unrestricted in terms of the weapons used, the territory or combatants involved, or the objectives pursued, especially one in which the laws of war are disregarded.” The concept of “total war” has lead to extreme policies by nations such as strategic bombings, commerce raiding, collective punishment, forced labor for military, targeting of agriculture, Scorched Earth policy, Ethnic Cleansing,  prolonged sieges that starved cities and nations, use of nuclear weapons, chemical warfare, Free Fire Zones and many more. These extreme policies carried out resulted in the idea that soldiers have a “moral duty” to resist, disobey and refuse to join the military of a nation, usually a draft. The paper will examine the actions of Soldiers who refused to fight wars, deserted the military, and in some cases turn on command, during the Vietnam War.

    What was the goal of the Vietnam War carried out largely through the United States?

    The Vietnam War was primarily fought over Vietnamese Independence from the “West” (Britain, France, the United States and other “allies” of the United States). After World War II, the Vietnamese wanted independence from France, because it had largely remained a French colony prior to the war and during the war under the Japanese who further devastated the country. The Vietnamese had fought off the Japanese with US support and had planned a constitution modeled after the US constitution. The country was split by a UN mandate in 1954 which split Vietnam into North and South regions. In 1955, the planned democratic elections were halted in the South over fears they would vote to unify with North Vietnam and that the so-called ‘communist” Ho Chi Minh would win. The US, in turn, installed a puppet dictator, Ngo Dinh Diem, a wealthy business owner, staunchly anti-communist, and a Catholic in charge of a largely Buddhist nation. Diem brutally persecuted Buddhists and become so unpopular that he was assassinated by the CIA in October of 1963 and replaced by his brother. From 1950 to 1975, the US waged a war to control formerly French Indochina via, military aid (up to 90% of French fighting with US dollars until they lost in 1954), also during and after with “military advisors”, constantly increasing until the US openly intervened in Vietnam in 1964, in which it consistently increased troop deployments until 1975, when the war finally came to an end.

    Nearly three million Americans would ultimately serve in Vietnam over the next 20 years (Wardog). Many Americans did not agree or even understand why the US was involved in Vietnam. The US lied about the “Gulf of Tonkin” incident in July of 1964, where a US ship was falsely attacked so President Lyndon B. Johnson could gain more war powers and the result had been a major escalation of the war. The Americans did not find out about this event until nearly ten years later. David Duncan, formerly a Green Beret in Vietnam, was one of the first military trainers in Vietnam. After his tour of duty, he came back and told people the war was a lie. “I was really proud of what I thought I was doing. The problem I had was realizing that what I was doing was not good. I was doing it right but I wasn’t doing right” (Sir!NoSir!). He took a stand openly against the war and resigned from the military. The war took a long time to end, it was pushed with starch anti-communism and what Einstein calls the “measles of mankind”, nationalism.

    Other soldiers such as Dr. Howard Levy refused to perform their military duties to help the war effort. The ideas of personal responsibility made many people not only question the war, hate the war, but also actively try to stop it or refuse to participate in it. Soldiers created underground newspapers in military barracks, ships and cafes across the country to spread the anti-war news. These would often become ban by the military officers and that banning of it would ironically arouse interests by more troops in what was being printed, almost a metaphor in a way for the drug war. Troops on aircraft carriers were literally signing petitions not to go to Vietnam, over 1,200 sailors signed it.

    From April 18 to April 23, 1971, some 900 Vietnam veterans were involved in a massive anti-war rally in Washington, DC. The events included lobbying Congress, “Guerilla Theater” in the streets and keep in mind this was during the 1971 investigation into war crimes, with “150 vets testifying from firsthand experience” (VVAW). This helped the organization Vietnam Veterans Against the War, formed in 1967, became a national organization. The April events were considered one of “the most powerful anti-war demonstration held up to that time”(VVAW). It scared President Richard Nixon so much that he received hourly reports on the demonstration (VVAW). 50 veterans even took over the office of Senator James Buckley (R-NY) after he refused to meet with them. The last day of the demonstration the veterans each individual made a statement against the war and then threw their medals over the White House fence protesting against the war. One Veteran from the demonstration famously stated that “If we have to fight again, it will be to take these steps.”

    The famous May Day Protests in 1971 saw, according to Chief Jerry V. Wilson, some 12,000 to 15,000 protestors block streets, throw “chicken shit” to mock the colonels, block government buildings and marching in protest of the war (Halloran). Most of the protesters were a mix of students and veterans. These people believed that serving the war effort was deeply wrong and that the war would end when soldiers refused to fight the wars. In the 1980s, under the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, much of this history of the anti-war movement was swept under the carpet and myths of the “hippies” who spat on soldiers started.

    Many sailors, pilots, and San Diego residents even joined the anti-war movement. Sailors on the USS Coral Sea, at first signed hundreds of petitions then thousands of them signed it. On Sept. 13, 1971, they wrote a petition to Congress stating that a majority of the sailors do not believe in the Vietnam War and asking that their ship not return to Southeast Asia. Before the petitions could be sent to Congress they were ripped off by the lifers and are now being held by the ship’s executive officer. He said the petition was legal but ignored attempts by the crew to get it back. So the crew ignored the executive officer and started a new petition. Over 300 men signed the first one and were pissed off when it was ripped up (Good Times/Vol. IV No. 29/OCT. 1, 1971). When the ship sailed out the Golden Gate on Monday for a two-week trial run, there were thousands of leaflets with the text of the petition and places for signatures.

    The naval carriers and pilot crews often had little combat casualties and dealt severe damage to the civilians across Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, especially when President Richard Nixon started slowly withdrawing troops in 1969, it meant more bombing and higher civilian deaths. Veterans started focusing on actively persuading people that the war was wrong. Saying things like I was there, I did terrible things and we shouldn’t be there, things like that are a lot more persuasive when you can say you fought in that war. Soldiers also did symbolic things like wear black armbands to say they support a protest at home. The Vietnam War is also where you see the “black power” movement start to emerge and groups like the black panthers. Where are legitimate questions asked why are black people fighting for a country that doesn’t provide them with equal rights? Famous athletes like Muhammad Ali refused to fight the war, perhaps modern day Kaepernick could be said as a mini Ali.

    Soon after their return home from Vietnam in 1971, a group of 236 GI’s from the 173rd Airborne Brigade made the following statement: “Throughout our time in the service we’ve seen minority group GI’s discriminated against. In Vietnam, that’s been evidenced by higher casualty rates. Other times it takes the form of slower promotions, higher penalties for rules violations, and the worst job assignments. We feel that the Army fosters racism and has purposely avoided dealing with the day-to-day problems of minority groups”(Boyle).

    To briefly address it I will reference what’s in Richard Boyle article not far below the previous quote,
    “Many white officers and NCO’s made a practice of harassing Black GI’s about their Afros which didn’t conform to “military regulations.” While right-wing soldiers were allowed to fly confederate flags on Martin Luther King’s birthday and could generally count on getting away with making open racial slurs, Black GI’s were given sentences of up to 6 months for giving the clenched fist salute and “dapping” (a brotherly greeting)”(Boyle).

    During the 10 years of the Vietnam War according to figures by the Pentagon, 500,000 deserted (Woolf). A large anti-war movement actively protesting, the Vietcong (a “determined enemy”), a military on collapse, Nixon announced the policy of “Vietnamization” making the Vietnamese takeover the efforts which completely failed and people knew it would fail in the 1970s.

    “By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and noncommissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near mutinous”(Heinl).
    THE COLLAPSE OF THE ARMED FORCES
    By Col. Robert D. Heinl, Jr.
    North American Newspaper Alliance
    Armed Forces Journal, 7 June 1971

    The US military had become almost self-governing in a way, even outside of its officers. Soldiers refusing to go on missions, people on drugs everywhere, especially heroin, officers being killed for given orders; to put it bluntly it was a circus. Because of the drug addiction and disapproval of the military, there was now an “epidemic of barracks theft”. This theft is even more devastating for moral where you have soldiers unable to trust each other, especially when in combat.

    “Soldier muggings and holdups are on the rise everywhere. Ft. Dix, N.J., has a higher rate of on-post crime than any base on the East Coast. Soldier muggings are reported to average one a night, with a big upsurge every pay-day. Despite 450 MP’s (one for every 55 soldiers stationed there – one of the highest such ratios in the country) no solution appears in sight (Heinl). Armed Forces Journal

    There are more military police than ever and still, the situation cannot be dealt with. The military was in a state of active revolt.

    “Crimes are so intense and violent in the vicinity of an open-gate “honor system” detention facility at Ft. Dix that, according to press reports, units on the base are unwilling to detail armed sentinels to man posts nearby, for fear of assault and robbery”(Heinl). Armed Forces Journal

    So bad that the military can’t even protect a gate so they have to have a bullshit system to protect themselves from looking weak. These issues are some of many that build up an identity of the military at war with itself that can’t maintain itself, in a war it doesn’t want to fight, unrest at home and a country trying to find itself. Toward the end of the war things got so bad a term “fragging” was given to the time when US soldier in Vietnam would attack their commanders for giving those orders to fight or go on missions.
    “Shortly after the costly assault on Hamburger Hill in mid-1969, the GI underground newspaper in Vietnam, “G.I. Says”, publicly offered a $10,000 bounty on Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt, the officer who ordered(and led) the attack”(Heinl).

    Several attempts were made on that soldier’s life although he went home alive. But even the brashness to publish something about killing an officer in a newspaper with a bounty shows how bad the situations were. This did affect judgments by leaders, “Another Hamburger Hill is definitely out “said one Major (Heinl). The problem of soldiers refusing to fight is evident throughout the end of the war, notable by two examples, the entire units of 196th Light Infantry Brigade publicly sat down on the battlefield and 1st Air Cavalry Division refused going down a dangerous trail (Heinl). When soldiers actively don’t believe in the “value” of the war serious consequences happen to the nation’s military.

    Briefly, I will talk about the problems of historically armies in World War 1, World War 2, Iraq, Afghanistan 1980s and Modern, while touching back to Vietnam. During WW1, over 240,000 British and Commonwealth soldiers were court-martialed (Hinke). World War II saw 1.7 million US courts-martial, “one-third of all American prosecutions”, and around 21,000 desertions (Hinke). During the Afghan War, 60,000-80,000 ethnic Soviet border troops from the Muslim Central Asian regions deserted (Hinke). 85,000 Afghan national troops also deserted during this period (Hinke).

    2001 to Today
    “Pentagon estimates more than 40,000 troops have deserted from all branches of military service. In 2001 alone, 7,978 deserted” (Hinke).

    All these problems of desertion relate to poor morale, belief in conflict, in some instances pay, the requirements of troops and length of the conflict. These conflicts are all about domination of regions, resources and/or competing for national interests. The Vietnam War adds up to a cumulative discontent with soldiers disbelief in the value of the conflict and actively trying to end the war. This dislike by the US soldiers does not mean that the Vietcong were just in their actions, who often killed, tortured, overtaxed and committed numerous atrocities, but as the song For What it’s Worth says, “Noboy is right if everybody’s wrong”.

    Examine the Vietnam War
    Examine the Opposition to the War in the Military(Army)
    – How they applied refusing to fight philosophy
    -Social Problems of the time (small)
    -US Military on verge of Collapse?

    Presentation
    Present – Stop video at 5:23 mins (https://search.alexanderstreet.com/view/work/bibliographic_entity%7Cvideo_work%7C1786515/sir-no-sir)
    (Ask Questions
    Question 1: What do you think about the idea “if people refuse to fight the wars can’t continue”?
    – Quick Facts:
    More than 21,000 American soldiers were convicted of desertion in World War Two
    Since 2000 estimate of more than 40,000 troops deserted from all branches of the military.
    In 2001 alone, 8,000 deserted the US military.
    More than 5,500 desertions 2003-2004
    Any guesses to how many deserted during the Vietnam War 10 year period? 500,000!
    -Question 2
    Was what they did right for refusing to fight what they perceived as an unjust war?
    -Quick Facts
    How many people if there was a draft implemented tomorrow and require you to show up at your local town hall would do so, to prepare for a military conflict against China and North Korea?

    Images and further Readings

    http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news-photo/viet-nam-veterans-against-the-war-demonstrate-against-the-news-photo/526094756#viet-nam-veterans-against-the-war-demonstrate-against-the-war-in-picture-id526094756 ( March in DC Arlington Cemetery)

    24 May 1969: Senior US officers say the strategic location of Hill 937 – ‘Hamburger Hill’ https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/24/troops-count-cost-vietnam-hamburger-hill-archive-1969

    http://www.substancenews.net/articles.php?page=6379

    Film

    References
    (2009). From US War Dogs : http://www.uswardogs.org/new_page_18.htm
    Between Hitler and Stalin . (n.d.). From UCRDC: http://www.ucrdc.org/HI-SCORCHED_EARTH_POLICY.html
    Boyle, R. (1973). GI Revolts The Breakdown of the US Army in Vietnam. From Richard Gibson : http://richgibson.com/girevolts.htm
    Col. Robert D. Heinl, J. (1971, June 7). THE COLLAPSE OF THE ARMED FORCES. North American Newspaper Alliance. From https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/Vietnam/heinl.html
    Col. Robert D. Heinl, J. (1971, June 7). THE COLLAPSE OF THE ARMED FORCES. From Montclair University : https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/Vietnam/heinl.html
    Drooling on the Vietnam Vets. (2000, May 2). From Slate : http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2000/05/drooling_on_the_vietnam_vets.html
    Halloran, R. (1972). 7,000 Arrested in Capital War Protest; 150 Are Hurt as Clashes Disrupt Traffic. From http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0503.html
    Turse, N. (2017, September 28 ). The Ken Burns Vietnam War Documentary. From The Intercept: https://theintercept.com/2017/09/28/the-ken-burns-vietnam-war-documentary-glosses-over-devastating-civilian-toll/
    United Nations Office of Genocide Prevnetion and The Resposiblity to Protect . (2017). Ethnic Cleansing . From United Nations : http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/ethnic-cleansing.html
    VVAW. (1977, Apirl ). Vets’ History: Operation “Dewey Canyon III”. From Vietnam Veterans Against the War: http://www.vvaw.org/veteran/article/?id=1656
    Woolf, C. (2015, March 26). From the Revolution to Bowe Bergdahl, desertion has a long history in the US. From PRI: https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-03-26/revolution-bowe-bergdahl-desertion-has-long-history-us
    Zeiger, D. (Director). (2005 ). Sir!No Sir! [Motion Picture].

    Links if need be
    https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/total_war

    The Ken Burns Vietnam War Documentary Glosses Over Devastating Civilian Toll


    http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/ethnic-cleansing.html
    http://www.ucrdc.org/HI-SCORCHED_EARTH_POLICY.html
    http://www.uswardogs.org/new_page_18.htm

    https://search.alexanderstreet.com/view/work/bibliographic_entity%7Cvideo_work%7C1786515/sir-no-sir
    https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/Vietnam/heinl.html
    http://richgibson.com/girevolts.htm
    https://www.britannica.com/topic/Students-for-a-Democratic-Society
    http://www.foundsf.org/index.php?title=Anti-Vietnam_war
    http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/press_box/2000/05/drooling_on_the_vietnam_vets.html
    http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0503.html
    https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-03-26/revolution-bowe-bergdahl-desertion-has-long-history-us

  • Theories of Democratic Transitions: “Democratization: theory and experience”

    Theories of Democratic Transitions: “Democratization: theory and experience”

    In the third chapter of the book “Democratization: theory and experience,” Laurence Whitehead looks at the concept of civil society and its relationship to democratization. If democracy is to be viewed as a complex and open-ended process, a more explanatory account is needed to describe it more effectively. Before a democratic transition can begin, there must exist a political community receptive to such change and willing to participate in a democratic system. The ideas of civil society and social capital provide condensed analogies to explain the structure of and simplify the ideas regarding the long-term changes that stem from democratization. Instead of focusing on political actors and what they seek to accomplish, political theorists should instead focus on the large-scale and broadly-based features of the entire political community.

    Laurence Whitehead then goes on to highlight the factors that help to define the idea of civil society. Theorists of civil society have seen more success in erasing its highly specific origins and have converted it into a free-standing category of thought that comes to mind when Westerners make comparative statements about the density of associative life in diverse political communities. Additionally, most non-Western discourses tend to lack an equivalent concept to the idea of civil society. Even though some argue that non-governmental organizations can be considered to be civil societies, they tend to lack the surrounding ethos, authenticity, and autonomy that are considered to be hallmarks of civil societies. Moreover, non-governmental organizations also lack the well-structured support from the larger community that civil societies often have. The definition of civil society also excludes associations such as households, religious institutions, and hierarchical institutions such as conscripted military forces and the bureaucracy of national government. Between such extremes, there may be an independent sphere of voluntary association in which interactions are governed by the principles of autonomy and self-respect.

    Laurence Whitehead also considers the factors that characterize stronger civil societies. Strong civil societies are characterized by a wider set of boundaries for interaction between individuals in society and by a larger acceptance of personal freedom and individual rights. As such, a strong civil society will allow for a greater chance for democracy to be successful and long-lasting despite challenges. Even if people reach an agreement on the factors that allow for the successful implementation of civil society, the results of their agreement will not be quantitative and more descriptive in nature. The idea of a descriptive category, according to Whitehead, is akin to an “empty box,” as there are not previously existing theories within it. As such, people can apply their own theories in interpretations regarding the political process. Additionally, such factors raise the question of how an “empty box” descriptive category shape such dynamic and long-term political process such as democratization. Any linkage between both factors would require both a description and an explanation of how the norms of civility can be compelling enough to reproduce over generations and override the loyalty demands of the state and the primary descriptive groups.

    After going over some of the theoretical approaches to the idea of civil society, Laurence Whitehead goes over what would be a tentative definition of the concept of civil society. If groups such as terrorist organizations, armed paramilitary groups, and criminal organizations are not to be defined as being members of civil society, Whitehead highlights the need to stipulate a general definition of civil society that highlights the importance of civility. According to Whitehead, civil society is defined as a set of self-organized intermediary groups that are relatively independent of both public authorities and private units of reproduction and production, can discuss collective actions in the defense and promotion of their interests, do not seek to replace state agents or private reproducers or to accept responsibility for governing the polity as a whole, and agree to act within pre-established legal guidelines. Additionally, Whitehead states that civil society rests on four different conditions. The first two conditions are that of dual autonomy and collective action. The next two conditions are non-usurpation and civility. The definition of civil society tends to exclude criminal organizations and paramilitary groups and any organizations that threaten individual rights.

    Laurence Whitehead next looks at the idea of civility and incivility. Following such a definition of civil society, it is unlikely that political scientists will find forms of voluntary associative organizations distributed evenly throughout the geographical and social terrain that is covered by the modern nation-state. Whitehead argues that neither the market or the state can be effectively used to even out the uneven social geography that is present throughout the world. The reason why the market is ineffective in evening out social geography because it obeys consumer sovereignty. Additionally, the state cannot solve such issues because its policies are skewed towards societal groups with the highest level of influence. Such factors lead to the question of what mechanism can be used to address the issue of uneven social geography, as civil society will eventually become out of sync with democratic citizenship. The weaknesses of civil society are often evident in many of the newer democracies. For example, efforts at democratization in many post-authoritarian countries are often overshadowed by antisocial forms of individualism that substitute the forms of civil associationalism favored by civil society theorists. Thus, the main advantages of civil society tend to be highly concentrated among a minority of the people in many of the new democracies.

    The dynamic between civil society and democratic citizenship is also addressed by Laurence Whitehead. Civil society tends to develop unevenly over time in a logic distinct from state formation. The resulting patterns of associative life and social communication typically emerge as highly structured with insiders, traditional favored sectors, and excluded sectors. Additionally, new democracies often only work effectively if they can restrain such exclusionary tendencies and indulge the people with the most social capital to adapt to a broader and longer-term view of their civic engagement in society. Even though civil society developed incrementally, modern political regimes are often created quickly and with short notice. Examples of political regimes created abruptly include the new nations created Europe after World War One, Asia and Africa during the 1950s and 1960s, and the democracies created in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union during the late 1980s. In all cases, formal political equality was established at a specific moment and the citizens earned a full set of democratic rights even though the creation of exclusionary political societies did not coincide with pre-existing maps of associative life between the citizenry.

    Civil society may also experience slow growth that eventually allows for the creation of the conditions favorable to democracy. Examples of the gradual development of civil society include Great Britain during the 17th Century and Spain during the 1970s. Additionally, it is also the case that the implementation of a democratic government will foster the development of civil society and create the conditions necessary for its success. Examples include many of the former communist countries and to the experience of many of the former territories of countries such as the US and Great Britain. There also exists the possibility that a civil society attains a high level of development, but never produce a democratic political regime, as in the case of Hong Kong. Moreover, a civil society may develop on the basis that its freedoms and rights can only be secured if there exists a series of exclusionary measures that prevent some members form full participation. Examples include the Palestinian population in Israel, the Cypriot population in Turkey, and African Americans in the Southern part of the US up until the 1960s.

    In conclusion, Laurence Whitehead explores the concept of civil society and its role in democratic transitions in “On Civil Society.” Whitehead underscores the importance of political theorists examining the factors that result in the development of strong civil societies that allow for the long-term stability of democratic governments. Additionally, Whitehead goes on to characterize the factors that characterize an effective civil society and the dynamic between civil societies and the expectations of democratic citizenship. An in-depth understanding of the idea of civil society will allow political scientists and political theorists to more effectively understand the factors that allow democratic governments to succeed in certain countries but ultimately fail in others. Moreover, the concept of civil society can be applied to explain potential democratic transitions in countries that a presently authoritarian.

  • Theories of Democratic Transitions: “The Civic Culture”

    Theories of Democratic Transitions: “The Civic Culture”

    In the book “The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, An Analytic Study,” Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba present a study of the political culture of democracy and discuss the social structures and processes that help to improve its overall stability. A common concern among political scientists is the future of democracy at the global level. In the years following World War II, events such as de-colonialization have raised some questions about the long-term stability of Democratic political systems and placed the issue into the broader context of the world’s culture. Despite the fact that Almond and Verba feel that the direction of political change at the global level is unclear, they argue that a political culture based upon individual participation will emerge due to demands by ordinary citizens. Additionally, Almond and Verba propose that the emerging nations will be presented with two different models of the participatory state, the democratic and totalitarian models of participation. The democratic model of participation offers the ordinary man the opportunity to take part in the political decision-making process as an influential citizen, whereas the totalitarian offers him the role of the “participant subject.” Both the democratic and totalitarian models of participation have appealed to emerging nations, but it is unclear which one will ultimately win.

    According to Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, the democratic model of participation will require more than the introduction of formal institutions of democracy such as freedom of speech, an elected legislature, and universal suffrage. A participatory democratic system also requires a consistent political culture. On the other hand, Almond and Verba argue that there are several problems with transferring democratic political culture to emerging nations. The first issue is that many of the leaders in developing states have little experience with the working principles of democratic policy and civic cultures such as political parties, interest groups, and electoral systems. As a result, the idea of democratic policy as conveyed to the leaders of new countries is incomplete and heavily stresses ideology and legal norms as opposed to conveying the actual feeling and attitude towards democratic ideals. A further reason why the diffusion of democracy to new nations is difficult is that they are confronted with structural problems. For example, many of the new nations are entering the global stage at a time in which they have not fully developed industrially. As a result, individual leaders may be drawn to a policy in which authoritarian bureaucracy promotes industrial development and technological advancement, and where political organization becomes a device for human and social engineering.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba then go on to discuss the idea of the civic culture. The civic culture is a mixed set of values that contains attributes from both modern and traditional cultures and allows them to interact and interchange without polarizing and destroying each other. Additionally, Almond and Verba describe the civic culture as pluralistic and based on communication and persuasion, consensus, diversity, and accessibility to gradual political change. Almond and Verba then explore the development of civic culture in Great Britain. One of the circumstances that resulted in the creation of a modern society in Britain was the emergence of a thriving merchant class and the involvement of the court and aristocracy in economic decisions. Moreover, the English Reformation and the increasing prevalence of religious diversity resulted in a higher level of secularization within British society, leading to greater modernization. As a consequence of both factors, Britain entered the 18th Century with independent merchants and aristocrats who established a parliamentary system that made it possible to assimilate rapid social changes without any sharp discontinuities. By establishing a civic culture, ordinary people were able to enter into the political process and develop British democratic structures.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba describe several different types of political cultures. According to Almond and Verba, political culture refers to the overall attitudes that individuals have regarding the political system and their attitudes toward their respective roles in the system. The term political culture is used because it allows Almond and Verba to separate the non-political concepts from their study and allows them to employ an interdisciplinary approach to their analysis of mass attitudes towards democracy. In classifying objects of political orientation, Almond and Verba start with the general political system, which deals with the organization as a whole. In explaining the components of the political system, Almond and Verba distinguish the specific roles or structures, the functions of incumbents, and particular public policies, decisions, or enforcement of decisions. These structures, incumbents, and decisions are then classified by involvement either in the political (input) process, or in the administrative (output) process.

    In their study of mass attitudes and values, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have identified three distinct types of political cultures. The first type of political culture mentioned by Almond and Verba is the parochial political culture. A parochial political culture emerges when the citizens of a particular nation have no understanding of the national political system, do not possess any tendency to participate in the input processes and have no consciousness of the output operations. Additionally, there are no specialized political roles within a parochial political culture, and the leadership roles are not separated from their religious and social orientations. Examples of parochial political cultures include African and Native American tribes and indigenous communities within particular nations. A subjective political culture is when people are aware of the mechanism of government and the political process, but are not taught to or are not allowed to participate in the system. Examples of subjective political cultures include traditional monarchies or authoritarian government systems. In a participant political culture, the populace is involved in the decision-making process and more or less has a say in public policy decisions. Examples of participant political cultures include the United States, Great Britain, and many other countries throughout the world. The three different classifications of political culture described by Almond and Verba does not assume that one classification replaces the other. On the other hand, the introduction of new classifications serves as a way to encourage previous political orientations to adapt.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba also mention that a number of political cultures are systematically mixed. A systematically mixed political culture occurs when there are elements of more simple and more complex patterns of political orientations. The first example of a systematically mixed political culture is the parochial-subject culture, which occurs when a majority of the population has rejected the exclusive claims of diffuse tribal, village, or feudal authority and has developed allegiance towards more complex political systems. Examples of parochial-subject political cultures include the Ottoman Empire and the loosely articulated African kingdoms. In a subject-participant culture, a substantial part of the population has acquired the ability and desire to become more engaged in governmental decisions, whereas the rest of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian political structure and have a relatively little desire to get involved in critical public policy decisions. Additionally, a successful shift from a subject to a participant culture requires the diffusion of positive orientations toward a democratic infrastructure, the acceptance of norms of civic obligation, and the development of a sense of civic competence among a substantial proportion of the population. France during the 19th Century and Germany during the early 20th Century are examples of subject-participant political cultures. A parochial-participant political culture occurs when elements of a participatory system are introduced to a traditionally parochial society. As a result of the lack of structure and experiences with democracy, parochial-participant political cultures have the most experiences with instability and teeter back and forth between democracy and authoritarianism.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba focus on the political cultures of five different countries in their study: The United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Almond and Verba selected these countries because they have experienced a wide range of historical and political experiences and have gone through a number of events that influenced their political systems. The United States and Great Britain both represent relatively successful experiments in democratic governance despite the fact that the rationale behind their acceptance of democratic values is different. For example, the political culture in Great Britain combines deference toward authority with a lively sense of the rights of citizen initiatives, whereas the political culture of the United States is based on political competence and participation rather than obedience to legitimate authority. Germany is included because its experiments in democratic governance during the late 19th and early 20th Century never resulted in the development of a participatory political culture necessary to legitimize democratic institutions of government. Almond and Verba include Italy and Mexico in their study because both represent less developed societies with transitional political systems.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba then go on to discuss the feelings towards government and politics that are prevalent in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Mexico. The first metric that they measured was the national factors in which the resident of all five countries were most proud of. A majority (85%) of American respondents cited their political system as the greatest source of pride they feel towards their country. In contrast, only 46% of British, 30% of Mexican, 7% of German, and 3% of Italian respondents cited their governmental institutions as their greatest source of national pride. Moreover, American and British respondents were more likely to refer to public policy accomplishments than the respondents from other countries. The Italian respondents cited their countries contributions to the arts and its cultural treasures, whereas the German respondents cited their countries economic system as the greatest source of national pride. Additionally, Mexican pride was distributed equally between the political and economic systems and the physical attributes of their country.

    The findings show that the Americans and British express great pride in their political institutions and thus feel the least alienated towards their political systems. On the other hand, the Germans and Italian respondents express a low level of pride in their political institutions and feel more alienated towards their governments. The results from the Mexican respondents show that they have a keen interest in political involvement despite the fact that their political culture is largely parochial. The fact that Mexican respondents expressed an interest in politics is due to past feelings associated by the populace with events such as the Mexican Revolution. The continued connection to the Mexican Revolution shows that the Mexican people believe that the revolution did not accomplish its stated political goals and that the process of political change is ongoing. When broken down by educational level, a majority of American, British, and Mexican respondents with higher levels of education expressed more pride in their respective political systems. Additionally, the fact that educational attainment does no influence the levels of national pride among the German and Italian respondents further suggests alienation from the political system as opposed to a lack of awareness of the system.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba also go on to explore the expectation of treatment by governmental authorities among the respondents from all five countries. Both Almond and Verba hypothesized that if the respondents expected fair treatment by governmental authorities, they would, in turn, express more support for legitimate authority. The respondents from the United States, Great Britain, and Germany expected a higher level of treatment by governmental authorities than the respondents from Italy and Mexico. Additionally, the expectation of treatment by governmental authorities varies by educational attainment. For example, respondents from the United States, Great Britain, and Germany with higher educational levels expect more equitable treatment by political authorities than respondents with lower levels of education. Even though the number of Italian and Mexican respondents expecting fair and equal treatment in government were relatively low, the differences between the advantaged and less advantaged groups regarding education were larger than in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. Such findings show that there is a connection between expectations regarding treatment by governmental authorities and alienation from the political system.

    The attitudes towards political communication are also discussed by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. A key component of democratic governments is the willingness for ordinary men and women to get involved in the political process. The main factor that influences such willingness is the level of comfort with discussing political issues. Respondents from the United States and Great Britain expressed the highest level of willingness to discuss politics. Additionally, even though German respondents expressed the highest frequency of following reports about public affairs, the number of people who discuss politics on a regular basis was lower than in the United States and Great Britain. On the other hand, the Mexican and Italian respondents expressed a relatively low willingness to discuss political affairs. With regards to the percent of respondents who refused to report their voting decision, the American, British, and Mexican respondents expressed little reluctance when revealing their political choice, whereas the German and Italian respondents expressed the highest level of reluctance. The reluctance on the part of the German and Italian respondents to reveal their voting choices shows that they feel that identifying with a political party is unsafe and inadvisable. Additionally, their unwillingness to reveal their voting choices indicates that there is a higher level of alienation from the political system on the part of the German and Italian respondents when compared to the American, British, and Mexican respondents.

    Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba then discuss the relationship between the civic culture and democratic stability and the impact of political culture on the political system that it belongs to. One view that Almond and Verba discuss is the rationality-activist model, which stipulates that a stable democracy involves the population to be informed and active in politics. Additionally, the rationality-activist model requires the citizens to base their voting choices on careful evaluation and carefully weighing in the alternatives. On the other hand, Almond and Verba mention that current research shows that most citizens in democratic nations rarely live up to the rationality-activist model. As such, Almond and Verba feel that the rationality-activist model is only a part of the civic culture and does not make up its entirety. Moreover, Almond and Verba describe the civic culture as a mixed political culture that involves both citizens who are informed and take an active role in politics and citizens who take a less active role in politics. The diverse nature of the civic culture also implies that the different roles in political such as parochial, subject, and participant do not replace each other and instead build upon each other.

    In conclusion, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba discuss the idea of the political culture and its relationship to democracy in “The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, An Analytic Study.” A major concern among political scientists is what factors result in the establishment of a political culture that allows for the stability of democracy within a particular country. In their study of political culture, Almond and Verba looked at several factors such as citizen views on government, views on treatment by governmental authorities, and the willingness of people to discuss political issues and the views that respondents from five different democracies have regarding them. The results of their study determined that countries with a long-term history of democratic governance were more likely to have political cultures that foster democratic ideas than countries with a shorter history of democratic government. Additionally, Almond and Verba discuss the relationship between political culture and the long-term stability of democratic political systems.

  • Seven Must-Know Facts For Planning College Political Events

    Seven Must-Know Facts For Planning College Political Events

    Have you ever tried to organize a college event? Did you get frustrated by issues of planning and attendance?

    College is a stressful environment often characterized by heavy workloads and important deadlines to meet. Planning a successful college event can be most successful by following certain guidelines to maximize your potential. Finals/Midterms times and prior to are the worst time to hold events. Here are some tips to help you set up a successful event:

    1. Early Bird gets the worm
    First-time Political leaning or educational events, in my opinion, are always best to be done in the first 2-3 weeks of school. Before Midterms and before homework starts getting overwhelming.

    2.Time Time Time
    Make sure the event isn’t at a time when most people are in class but perhaps “college hour,” or a time when people want to have some pizza after class.

    3. Who’s Who?
    Figure out who are the Demographic most likely to attend. Figure out how to attract them, like LGBTQ attract them by telling them about the issue and how it’s important in their life. How they should come and will benefit. Then figure out how to attract large segments of the student or other population.

    4. Monopoly MOFO
    Making sure your event has a monopoly over the time/date is important so other events don’t drain from your audience. If a more “liberal” socially- (not economically that word is misused today), then figure out what other events that draw people in that realm may be happening or run by and inform them of your event beforehand to make sure you have a leg up on them. Something as simple as saying “hey come to my event” and “save the date.” Informing the faculty who are “experts” in that field your event is on can help spread the word as well.

    5. Art Bitches
    Make sure you have an attractive flyer to catch someone’s eye to the event. This should also include online postings like on Instagram/Facebook which are drawing more attention these days. A picture is worth a thousand words so keep it relative to the event.

    6. Munchies!
    Having Pizza at the event can go a long way where people who aren’t generally as interested now come to the event and want a piece of that action. So food is a way to lure people just make sure you try to gauge the attendance with food supply otherwise it will take away from an event. Refillable cups is advised along with water to reduce plastic use and make your event more environmentally friendly.

    7. Songs of the time (EXTRA)
    Having a musician play relevant music at the end of the event can lure more people- his or her friends to attend- and ends an element that there will be a musician playing at the end. Try to keep the music almost relevant to the event. For example, if the event discusses healthcare policy, include a song that talks about health care or if the event is about immigration feature a song about immigration. Try to keep the music it a genre you think people will like. Solidarity Singers in NJ are known for political songs and is a good source for political events.

    Early in Semester
    During a right day of week/Time
    Figuring out the target group
    Making sure the target group has only your event to attend
    Posters that are well designed
    Some food at the event
    (Extra)Perhaps music performance at the end or start
    (These are lessons I have learned from my failed events-XOXO )

  • Samuel Huntington “Political Development and Political Decay” Summary

    Samuel Huntington “Political Development and Political Decay” Summary

    In the article, “Political development and political decay,” Samuel Huntington explores the conflict between political mobilization and institutionalization and the importance of institutional development concerning democratization. A common occurrence in much of the developing world is the fact that political participation is growing much more rapidly than formal political institutions. In many of the developing societies, the conflict between mobilization and institutionalization is an area of chief concern in politics. Despite the growing importance of political institutionalism, much of the literature written about the developing world tends to ignore the idea for the most part. Instead, political scientists tend to emphasize the processes of modernization and the idea of social mobilization and increasing political participation. Huntington argues that a more balanced view of contemporary politics in the developing world instead requires more attention to the growth of political institutions and that it is useful to distinguish political development from modernization and to instead identify political development with the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. Additionally, Huntington states that rapid increases in political mobilization and participation instead undermine political institutions and lead to political decay

    Samuel Huntington first explores the concept of political development as modernization. Even though definitions of political development are varied, most share two closely related characteristics. The first characteristic is that growth is synonymous with the idea of modernization. As such, political development is also defined as political modernization. The second is that there exist many ways to measure political development because modernization and development are broad topics that cover many different areas. Additionally, definitions of political development tend to itemize many different criteria. Even though the rules defining political development used are varied, the characteristics that make up political development are all features of the processes of modernization. Four categories occur in all of the definitions of political development. The first characteristic is that of rationalization, which highlights the focus on functional differentiation and achievement criteria. The second criteria are nationalism, which emphasizes nation-states and nation-building as fundamental aspects of political development. The third criteria are the idea of democratization, which is essentially a focus on competition and equalization of power. The last criteria are mobilization, which is a focus on political participation. Political participation stipulates that the greater the level development, the greater the level modernization. As such a higher level of modernization results in increased political mobilization and political participation.

    Samuel Huntington then goes on to discuss some of the problems surrounding the definitions of political development. The first issue he identifies is that the identification of political development with modernization or with factors usually associated with modernization drastically limits the applicability of the concept. As modernization is defined in immediate terms, its relevance is thus limited to only modern nation-states or emerging nation-states. Development is identified with only one type of political system, rather than as a concept that can be used to characterize any political system. The second problem with many definitions of political development is that it is also broadened to include almost all politically relevant aspects of the modernization process. Additionally, there is a natural tendency to assume that political development is all a piece, that one thing that leads to positive results is compatible with another, often different thing. The third issue is that many definitions of political development fail to distinguish the empirical relevance of the components making up the definition. The gap between theory and reality also suggests a fourth difficulty in many concepts of political development. The difficulty is that there exist only one-way ideas and that their reversibility is not permitted. On the contrary, Huntington argues that any concept of political development should be reversible and that is should ideally define both political development and the circumstances in which political decay occurred.

    Samuel Huntington next looks at political development as institutionalization. Huntington states that it is important to define political development as the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. Such a characterization would separate development from modernization and can be applied to the analysis of political systems of any sort, not just modern ones. Additionally, it can be defined in reasonably precise ways which can be measured using qualitative means. As a concept, it suggests that movement can be in both directions and it focuses on the mutual interaction between the social processes of modernization and strengths and weaknesses of political structures in transitional, traditional, and modern societies. The strength of political organizations and procedures vary with their scope of support and their level of institutionalization. The scope is the extent to which the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in the society, whereas the level of institutionalization in a political system is defined by the overall adaptability, complexity, and autonomy of a political organization.

    Samuel Huntington also states that an organization or procedure is more institutionalized if it is more adaptable to change. On the other hand, the less flexible and more rigid an organization is, it has a lower level of institutionalization. Adaptability is an acquired organizational characteristic and is a function of environmental challenge and age. For example, the more problems which have arisen in its environment and the older it is, an organization is more adaptable to change. Additionally, rigidity is more characteristic of young organizations than of old ones. On the other hand, experienced organizations and procedures are not necessarily adaptable if they have existed in a static environment. If an organization has developed a set of responses for dealing effectively with one type of problem, and if it is then confronted with a new issue, the organization might become a victim of its past successes and be unable to adjust to any new challenges. However, the first hurdle is the biggest one and success in adapting to one environmental challenge paves the way for successful adaptation to subsequent challenges. Some changes in an environment, such as changes in personnel, are inevitable for all organizations and other changes in circumstances may be produced by an organization itself.

    Samuel Huntington then states that an organization is more institutionalized if it is more complex in its structure and procedures. Complexity often involves both multiplications of organizational subunits and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits. The greater the number of subunits, the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of all its members. An organization which has many purposes is better able to adjust to the loss of any one purpose than an organization which has only one purpose. The differentiation of subunits within an organization also may or may not be based along functional lines. Changes in the functions of the whole, however, are reflected by shifts in the power and roles of the subunits. Additionally, if the subunits are multifunctional, they have greater institutional strength, but they may also contribute less flexibility to the organization overall. For example, a political system with parties of social integration has less institutional flexibility than one with parties of exclusive representation. Huntington also points to the fact that relatively simple traditional political systems are often overwhelmed by the process of modernization, whereas more complex traditional systems are more likely to adapt to new demands. An example of a complex traditional political system that was able to adapt to new requirements was Japan, which adjusted its traditional political institutions to the modern world due to their relative complexity.

    Samuel Huntington then looks at the concept of coherence and disunity. The concept of coherence and disunity stipulates that the more unified and coherent an organization is, the more it is more highly institutionalized. On the other hand, the greater the disunity of an organization, the lower the level of institutionalization. A level of consensus is often considered to a be a prerequisite of any social group. Additionally, an effective organization requires substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes on issues which come up within those boundaries. The agreement among groups must also extend to those active in the system. Non-participants or those only sporadically and marginally participant in the system do not have to share the consensus and usually, do not share it to the same extent as the participants. An organization can theoretically be autonomous without being coherent and coherent without being autonomous. However, the two concepts are often closely linked together. Autonomy enables the organization to develop a style which becomes a distinctive mark of its behavior. Autonomy also serves to prevent the intrusion of disruptive external forces, though it does not protect against disruption from internal sources. Moreover, rapid or substantial expansions in the membership of an organization or the participants in a system tend to weaken coherence.

    The dynamic between mobilization and institutionalization is also explored by Samuel Huntington. Social mobilization and political participation is rapidly increasing in much of the developing world, which is, per Huntington, directly responsible for the deterioration of political institutions in these areas. For example, Huntington concludes that rapid industrialization and urbanization create discontinuities which give rise to mass society. He uses the case of labor unions as an example. In areas and industries with high industrial growth, the creation and institutionalization of unions often lag, and mass political movements are likely to emerge among the workers. As unions are eventually organized, they are vulnerable to outside influences in their early stages. As such, the rapid influx of large numbers of people into a new organization provides opportunities for mass-oriented elites to penetrate the organization. Considering such factors, one can make the conclusion that economic growth results in higher political instability.

    Huntington also states that mobilization may result simply from increases in communications, which can stimulate major increases in aspirations that may be only partially, if at all, satisfied. The result of such occurrences is a revolution of rising frustrations among the masses Increases in literacy and education may bring more political instability. For example, countries in Asia such as Burma, Ceylon, and South Korea are highly literate but are relatively unstable politically. Additionally, literacy does not necessarily stimulate democracy as well. For example, Cuba was the fifth most literate country in Latin America but was the first one to implement a communist political system. Increased communication may generate demands for more “modernity” than can be delivered and stimulate a reaction against modernity and activate traditional forces. Since the political arena is typically dominated by the more modern groups, increased communication may bring into the arena new, anti-modern groups and break the consensus exists among the leading political participants. It may also mobilize ethnic minority groups who were uninvolved politically, but who now acquire a self-consciousness and divide the political system along ethnic lines. Moreover, nationalism often stimulates political decay as opposed to national integration.

    Institutional decay has also become a common phenomenon in many modernizing countries. Coups d’état and military interventions in politics are one index of low levels of political institutionalization and occur when political institutions lack autonomy and coherence. For example, eleven of twelve modernizing states outside Latin America which were independent before World War Two experienced coups or attempted coups after World War Two. Additionally, of twenty states that became independent between 1945 and 1959, fourteen had coups or coup attempts by 1963. Moreover, of twenty- four states which became independent between 1960 and 1963, seven experienced coups or attempted coups by the end of 1963. Instability in Latin America was also less frequent during the first half of the 20th Century than during the second half. In the years between 1917 and 1927, military leaders occupied the presidencies of the twenty Latin American republics 28% of the time. On the other hand, between 1947 and 1957, military leaders were in power 45% of the time. Additionally, seventeen out of the twenty countries of Latin America experiences coups or attempted coups in the years between 1945 and 1964 and only Mexico, Uruguay and Chile witnessed relative political stability.

    Samuel Huntington argues that differences that exist in mobilization and institutionalization suggest four ideal types of politics. For example, modern and developed civic polities are characterized by high levels of both mobilization and institutionalization. On the other hand, primitive polities have low levels of both mobilization and institutionalization. Contained polities are highly institutionalized but have low levels mobilization and participation. The dominant political institutions of contained polities may be either traditional, such as monarchies or modern, such as political party systems. If they are the former, such polities may have great difficulties in adjusting to rising levels of social mobilization. The traditional institutions may ultimately collapse, and the result would be a corrupt polity with a high rate of participation but a low level of institutionalization. This type of polity characterizes much of the modernizing world. For example, many of the more advanced Latin American countries have achieved comparatively high indices of literacy, per capita income, and urbanization, though their politics remains notably underdeveloped. Distrust and hatred have produced a continuing low level of political institutionalization. In reverse fashion, a country may be politically highly developed, with modern political institutions, while still very backward in terms of modernization. An example of a country with a strong level of political development, but lacking a high level of modernization is India. For example, India was characterized by low levels of development throughout the 1950s, but had a high level of political development when compared to many countries in Asia and Europe.

    Samuel Huntington also looks at the relationship between political institutions and public interests. A society with weak political institutions lacks the ability to curb the excesses of personal and parochial desires. Without strong political institutions, society lacks the means of defining and realizing its common interests. The capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create and follow public interests. Traditionally, the public interest has been approached in three ways. The public interest has been identified either with abstract and substantive values and norms such as natural law, justice, or right reason; or with the specific interest of either individuals, groups, and classes. Additionally, it has been defined with the result of a competitive process among individuals or groups. The problem with these approaches is to arrive at a definition which is concrete and general. On the other hand, what is concrete in most cases lacks generality and what is general lacks concreteness. One approach to solve this problem is to define the public interest in terms of the concrete interests of the governing institutions. A society with highly institutionalized governing organizations and procedures is, in this sense, more able to articulate and achieve its public interests. The public interest, in this sense, is not something which exists in natural law or the will of the people. Instead, it is whatever strengthens and forms governmental institutions. The public interest is also created and brought into existence by the institutionalization of government organizations. In a complex political system, many governmental organizations and procedures represent many different aspects of public interest.

    Samuel Huntington looks at the strategies of institutional development. If decay of political institutions is a widespread phenomenon in the “developing” countries and if a major cause of this decay is the high rate of social mobilization, it encourages political scientist to incorporate these tendencies into any model of political change which we employ to understand the politics of such areas. If effective political institutions are necessary for stable and eventually democratic government, it encourages us to suggest strategies of institutional development. In suggesting strategies of institutional development, we should recognize the fact that psychological and cultural characteristics of peoples differ markedly and with them their abilities at developing political institutions. Additionally, we should recognize that the potentialities for institution-building differ between societies, but that political institutions can be built ins all societies. Two methods of furthering societal development are that anything which slows social mobilization creates conditions favorable to the preservation or institutions, and that strategies can be applied directly to the issues of institution building.

    In conclusion, Samuel Huntington looks at the connection between political mobilization and institutionalization and the importance of institutional development concerning democratization. Huntington argues that modernization and rapid political mobilization result in political decay as opposed to the growth of political systems and increased political stability. Additionally, Huntington looks at the differing definitions of political modernization and concludes that all definitions share several common elements. Huntington also underscores the importance of political scientists and sociologists alike to examine the importance of the development and growth of political institutions in the developing world.

  • Thomas Hobbes and Leviathan

    Thomas Hobbes and Leviathan

    One of the most influential philosophers in recent history is Thomas Hobbes, who was active in Great Britain during the 17th Century. Hobbes was a proponent of social contract ethics, which is the idea that both an individual’s moral and political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live in. During his life, Hobbes published many different works on subjects ranging from political theory, philosophy, and history. The most famous work written by Thomas Hobbes is “Leviathan,” which was written in 1651 in response to the English Civil War, which resulted in the establishment of a parliamentarian system and the reduction in the power of the monarchy. Even though Hobbes rejected the divine right of kings to rule over their citizens, he argued that a powerful king is needed to rule to prevent any instability or societal disorder.

    In the chapter “Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning their Felicity and Misery,” Thomas Hobbes directs his study to that of human nature. An understanding of human nature will allow people to progress from the state of nature to a stable and civilized society. Hobbes noted that people are continuously moved by what they both dislike and like. As such, people have certain ends on their minds that they are seeking to achieve. Because many people desire the same goals, they are in a continual state of competition and conflict with each other. If the appetites of individuals had limits, the conflict between people would not be as complicated. On the other hand, Hobbes claims that people are never satisfied with any amount of power and are thus always in a power struggle with others. Even though it seems that in such a state of nature the strong would triumph over the weak and some natural equilibrium would be instituted, the nature of power distribution prevents this from occurring. According to Hobbes, individuals are by nature equal in their abilities. From such equality in the state of nature arises a perpetual state of continual conflict. Hobbes then argues that without a common power to mediate any disputes, the state of nature is nothing more than a state of perpetual war and conflict.

    Thomas Hobbes then goes over the concept of the Laws of Nature in the chapter “Of the first and second Natural Lawes, and of Contracts.” A law of nature is a given rule that is discovered through pure reason. Such laws assert the concept of self-preservation and reject any acts that are ultimately destructive to human life overall. A law of nature is inherently known by every person because natural mental faculties can understand it. The first law of nature stipulates that every person must attempt to promote and seek peace. The next law of nature is that people must divest themselves of individual rights to escape the state of natural war. The mutual transferring of rights as illustrated in the second law of nature is known as a contract and is the primary foundation of the idea of moral obligations. The third law says that people must be required to keep the contract that they make and that it is not enough to only make such contracts. The third law of nature is the foundation for the concept of justice and fairness in the legal system. Because of the inherent desire for increased power, there always exists incentives to break such a contract. Hobbes also states that additional natural laws must come into effect to preserve the functionality of the third law of nature.

    In conclusion, Thomas Hobbes explored the ideas of social contract ethics throughout “Leviathan.” Social contract theory is an entirely different branch of ethical theory that explores the idea that moral and political obligations of an individual are dependent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society or governmental system in which they live in. The idea of social contract ethics combines both elements from philosophy, political theory, and history to develop an alternative theory to explain the ethical decisions that people make. Additionally, Hobbes examines the ideas of the state of nature and the laws of nature and determines that both concepts serve to influence the overall stability of certain societies and political systems.

  • The Elite Variable in Democracy

    John Higley and Michael Burton argue that the decisions by societal elites play a role in democratic transitions regime breakdowns in their 1989 article “The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns.” Higley and Burton state that democratic transitions and breakdowns can be understood by studying changes in the internal relations of national elites. The first type of national elite that they discuss is the disunified national elite, which produces a series of unstable regimes that tend to alternate between authoritarian and democratic on a regular basis. On the other hand, a consensually unified elite results in a much more stable governmental system that has the potential to evolve into a stable democracy if socioeconomic conditions permit.

    According to Higley and Burton, elite disunity stems from the process of nation-state formation. The construction of new states is typically a complicated process characterized by violence and conflict. Additionally, elite disunity involves the repression of certain elite groups by others, which makes disunity inevitable. A disunified elite may cause political instability and leave an opportunity for outside forces to overthrow the regime.

    Elite transformations, according to Higley and Burton, occur in two steps. In the first step, various factions enter into voluntary collaboration in electoral politics to mobilize a solid electoral majority and protect their interests by controlling government executive power. In the second step, the primary hostile factions opposing this coalition eventually abandon their ideological stances and adopt those of the winning coalition. As a result of this development, a consensually unified national elite is created, and a stable democratic regime typically emerges.

    This article is a response to “The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns,” by John Highley and Michael Burton. It is found at: https://www.scribd.com/document/73166207/HIGLEY-BURTON-The-Elite-Variable-in-Democratic-Transitions-and-Breakdowns

  • “The political economy of democratic transitions” Response

    “The political economy of democratic transitions” Response

    In the article “The political economy of democratic transitions,” Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman explore the effects of socioeconomic factors on democracy. Since the early 1970s, articles by Dankwart Rustow on democratic transitions have been reference consistently by experts. Rustow analyzed the socioeconomic, political, and psychological prerequisites of democracy. Democratization is the result of regime change, among numerous other factors. Most contemporary theories of democratization do not specify the resources that contending parties bring to negotiation and do not consider what is at stake for those involved. In contrast, the approach by Kaufman and Haggard examines the leverage of incumbents against the opposition. Additionally, they look at ten middle-income countries in Latin America and Asia to better explain where democracy came from.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman start in the 1970s. Guillermo O’Donnell argued that economic changes create issues and incentives for militaries and individuals to abandon democracy and turn to authoritarianism. Additionally, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (other theorists) instead argued that electoral institutions increased polarization (such as the recent Clinton-Trump Presidential divide). Both Linz and Stephan argue that polarization is a reflection of a failure of democratic leadership.

    The collapse of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s increased interest in democratic transitions. During this period, politicians were influenced by Rustow’s emphasis on strategic interaction and negotiation. For example, after the Cold War, a number of new democracies throughout Europe due to these strategic negotiations.

    The approach by Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman focuses on the effects of economic circumstances on the preferences, resources, and strategies of the most important political actors in democratic transitions. In addition, they recognize that many factors contributed to the democratic transformations of the 1980s and 1990s such as diplomatic pressures, structural changes associated with long-term economic development, and the spread of democratization within neighboring countries Moreover, Haggard and Kaufman argue that there is no relationship between regime change and economic crises.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman go over the responses to the economic crises by authoritarian regimes. The financial crises of the 1970s and 1980s were far reaching and cut across all social classes, necessitating policy reform. Kaufman and Haggard argue that poor economic performance reduces the power of authoritarian leaders. Economic declines such as the 2008 Great Recession alter the status quo between governments and the private sector. Cooperation between private sector business groups and authoritarian rulers is crucial for the stability of authoritarian rule. If the private sector loses confidence in the ability of the government to manage the economy, businesses begin supporting opposition groups. In contrast, even though authoritarian regimes may decline in periods of weaker economic growth, they have greater power in a stronger economy because of public dissatisfaction.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman go on to further support their arguments by comparing transitions from military rule in ten different countries. The six crisis transitions the look at include Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, the Philippines, Brazil, and Peru. The regime transitions in Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, and the Philippines occurred during economic downturns. Even though the transition in Brazil occurred during economic recovery, it experienced severe economic shocks several years earlier and still continued to face a series of unresolved adjustment challenges at the time of their respective transitions. The four non-crisis transitions they examine are Chile, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey. The authoritarian governments in these transitions withdrew due to a variety of international and domestic political pressures. Additionally, the transitions in each country occurred against the backdrop of strong economic growth and economic stability. These conditions help to account for variations in the terms of the transition and the political alignments that emerged under new democratic regime.

    The first area that Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman look at is the terms of the transitions in both the crisis and non-crisis scenarios. One area in which the differences between the crisis and non-crisis cases exists is through the processes through which constitutional orders were written and implemented. In Chile, Turkey, and Thailand, the transitions occurred under constitutions drafted by the outgoing authoritarian government. Even though incoming opposition political leaders succeeded in including some amendments, these constitutions provided the framework in which new democratic governments operated. On the other hand, opposition forces held much greater influence during crisis transitions. Their influence was particularly strong in the Philippines and Argentina. In such cases, opposition political leaders made choices with little input from the outgoing government and returned to the constitutions in effect prior to authoritarian rule. The relative strength of authoritarian and opposition forces in the negotiation process also influenced governmental design. The two objectives of outgoing authoritarian rulers were to preserve the military’s organizational autonomy and to impose limits on the opposition.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman then go over the fact that outgoing authoritarian political leaders often create authoritarian enclaves in the noncrisis transitions. The main authoritarian enclave set up by the outgoing authoritarian rulers was the military. For example, Thailand’s military continued to be a dominant force in its political system despite the country’s transition towards democracy and Pinochet remained as the commander of the Chilean military after he stepped down from power in 1990. Additionally, civilian oversight of the Turkish army remained limited after its transition to democracy in 1983. On the other hand, economic difficulties and loss of support prevented outgoing leaders from preserving either military prerogatives or other means of political influence in the crisis scenario. In the case of the Philippines, the military provided crucial support for the democratic transition and thus had considerable support within the new democratic government. Additionally, the Brazilian military retained the most extensive institutional rights of any military among the crisis transitions but left office constrained by deep internal divisions and a decline in support among both politicians and the general public. As a result, its influence on the new Brazilian constitution is relatively limited when compared to a number of non-crisis transitions such as Chile and Turkey.

    Restrictions on political participation is another way in which both the non-crisis and crisis scenarios vary. In the non-crisis transitions, mechanisms of exclusion range from bans on political activity and outright repression to subtle manipulation of electoral laws. Exclusionary mechanisms were most visible in Turkey. For example, the government used legal restrictions on Islamic fundamentalism to clamp down on press freedom. The main labor confederation also remained banned after the transition in 1983 and the government sought to persecute union activists. Moreover, the Turkish military also banned numerous political organizations. On the other hand, the elimination of restrictions on labor and political groups was much more evident in the crisis cases. For example, labor unions regained the right to organize, strike, and press their political demands in countries such as Bolivia and many of the countries characterized by crisis transitions implemented open electoral laws that resulted in the development of strong multi-party political systems.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman also explore the political economy of new democracies. Even though both Haggard and Kaufman reject the notion that social interests determine the prospects for democracy, they recognize that the opportunities for political elites to mobilize support is dependent on how economic policy affects the distribution of income across different social groups. The first important factor that Haggard and Kaufman note is that the economic legacy of authoritarian rule determines the policy agenda of democratic successors. New democratic governments that come to power in the wake of crises confront a difficult set of economic policy choices. New democratic leaders can often trade political gains for short-run economic losses, but the transition itself raises expectations that government will respond to new political challenges. Additionally, policy reform is difficult because economic problems are pressing and demands for short-term economic relief are widespread. Economic evidence from middle income developing countries provides broad support for these expectations. For example, average budget deficits were almost twice the level of the pre-transition period, whereas in the noncrisis cases deficits remained low. Moreover, four of the crisis cases (Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru) experienced hyperinflation during their first democratic governments.

    In the noncrisis transitions, new democratic governments faced a different agenda of policy reforms. Even though economic reform was less pressing, even the most economically successful authoritarian governments were faced with societal issues that could erupt under democratic rule. Among the noncrisis transitions, the consequences of a large social deficit were most evident in Turkey, where inequality grew steadily during the 1980s. Despite such challenges, many of the countries that experienced non-crisis transitions made headway. For example, Chile’s democratic government had some success in reducing poverty and allowing for increased economic equality while maintaining strong economic growth throughout the 1990s. On the other hand, the continuing power of interests linked to the old regime placed limits on the extent to which the new democratic governments could adequately address the economic demands of previously excluded social groups.

    Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman also argue that the transition paths also affect the evolution of the political institutions by which economic demands and policy dilemmas are addressed. In the non-crisis cases, new democratic governments often had to deal with the persistence of nondemocratic enclaves, the autonomy of the military establishment, and links between political groups and business elites. Efforts to address political legacies risked to unravel the democratic bargain and make the respective societies more at risk to return to authoritarianism. On the other hand, the crisis cases exhibited a different set of institutional dilemmas. The overall economic circumstances encouraged executives to concentrate their authority. Such a pattern has been evident where economic issues require complex stabilization packages. Divergent forces within the party system also increased the difficulty of sustaining support and strengthened the incentives for executives to govern in an autocratic manner. Democratic institutions may also be undermined by a failure to take swift and effective action in the cases of severe economic crises. However, the absence of institutionalized consultation with legislators and interest groups deprives executives of needed feedback that may be essential to correct past policy errors.

    In conclusion, Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman explore the impact of economic crises on democratic transitions in “The political economy of democratic transitions.” Their case study includes several different countries from Latin America and Asia and focuses on factors such as economic performance and the types of transitions towards democracy in each country. Through their study of the experiences of each country, Haggard and Kaufman conclude that economic policy and performance serves as a way to influence both transitions towards democracy and the future success of newly established democracies.

  • The Political System of Iran

    Since the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution, there has been much analysis by political scientists and political leaders as to what makes up the Iranian political system. The current Iranian constitution was adopted on December 3, 1979, after a referendum in which 99.5% of the population voted in favor, and was officially ratified on July 28, 1982. Here is an overview of the main components of the Iranian political system.

    ali_khamenei_delivers_nowruz_message_02 Ali Khamenei has been the Supreme Leader of Iran since 1989 and is arguably the most powerful political figure in Iran today.

    The Supreme Leader
    The most important politician in Iran is the Supreme Leader. According to Iran’s Constitution, the Supreme Leader is responsible for setting the tone and direction of Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. The Supreme Leader also is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, controls Iran’s intelligence and security operations, and has the authority to declare war. The Supreme Leader has the power to appoint and dismiss the leaders of the judiciary, the state radio and television networks, and the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Another role of the Supreme Leader is that he has the power to appoint the twelve members of the Council of Guardians, the powerful body that oversees the activities of Parliament and determines which candidates are qualified to run for public office.

    The current Supreme Leader is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution, upon Khomeini’s death in 1989. Khomeini and Khamenei are the only two men to have held office since the founding of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. Prior to serving as Supreme Leader, Khamenei was elected President of Iran in October of 1981 and led the country through the Iran-Iraq War.

    images-1 Hassan Rouhani is the current President of Iran and is a member of the centrist Moderation and Development Party.

    The President
    The president is the second-highest-ranking official in Iran. The President of Iran is elected for a 4-year term and is limited to serving no more than two consecutive terms. though the president has a high public profile, his power is in many ways trimmed back by the constitution, which subordinates the entire executive branch to the Supreme Leader. The president is responsible primarily for setting the country’s economic and social policies and plays the role of representing Iran internationally.

    The current President of Iran is Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani was first elected in 2013 with 51% of the vote and is up for re-election in 2017. As of right now, he is expected to be re-elected relatively easily considering that his two strongest potential opponents (former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iranian General Qasem Soleimani) have ruled out running for the Presidency.

    The Guardian Council
    The Guardian Council is a body that oversees the activities of Parliament and determines which candidates are qualified to run for public office. It consists of 12 experts in Islamic law, six of them appointed by the supreme leader and six nominated by the judiciary and approved by Iran’s Parliament. The Guardian Council has the power to overturn parliamentary bills considered to be in violation of Iran’s constitution.

    Additionally, the system that the Guardian Council uses to vet candidates for political office is similar to the pre-1972 Presidential process in the United States, which consisted of either members of Congress or political party elites selecting the Presidential nominees of both the major political parties. Supporters of the Guardian Council vetting political candidates argue that it allows stability in the Iranian government by limiting governmental positions to those with a high level of political experience. On the other hand, critics of the Iranian political system argue that it reduces the chances for gradual political reform to occur in Iran and limits political office to a select few.

    The Assembly of Experts
    The responsibilities of the Assembly of Experts are to appoint the Supreme Leader, monitor his performance, and remove him if he is deemed incapable of fulfilling his duties. Members are elected for an eight-year term. Only clerics can join the assembly and candidates for the Assembly of Experts are vetted by the Guardian Council.

    Ali Larijani is the current Iranian Parliamentary Speaker. He is a member of the reformist Pervasive Coalition of Reformists political coalition. Ali Larijani is the current Iranian Parliamentary Speaker. He is a member of the Pervasive Coalition of Reformists political coalition.

    The Parliament
    The Iranian Parliament (Majlis) is a unicameral legislature comprised of 290 members who are elected to four-year terms. The members of parliament draft legislation and approve the country’s budget. Additionally, the Iranian Parliament is held in check by the Guardian Council, whose members examine all laws passed by Parliament to determine their compatibility with Islamic law. The current Speaker of the Iranian Parliament is Ali Larijani, who has served since 2008.

    Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is the chair of the Expediency Discernment Council. He previously served as Iran's President from 1989-1997. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani is the chair of the Expediency Discernment Council. He previously served as Iran’s President from 1989-1997.

    Expediency Discernment Council
    The role of the Expediency Discernment Council is to solve disputes and conflicts between the Iranian Parliament and the Guardian Council. Additionally, it serves as an advisory panel to the Supreme Leader. Its current chair is Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who previously served as Iran’s President from 1989-1997 and as the chairman of the Iranian Parliament from 1980-1989.

  • Hamas: Political Heroes or International Terrorists?

    Hamas: Political Heroes or International Terrorists?

    In the Islamic world, there has been much debate over the relationship between Islam and politics. Some Muslims argue in favor of increased secularism, whereas others argue that both Islam and politics are interconnected. As a result, a diverse array of political movements has emerged throughout the Islamic world. The individual goals and agendas of various political movements in Islam vary; in addition, the factors behind their origins are diverse as well. One such example of an Islamic political organization is Hamas, which is based in the Palestinian territory. Hama is currently one of two political parties active in the Palestinian Authority, having won a majority of the vote in the Palestinian national elections in 2006. As a result of its use of violence to achieve political goals, Hamas is controversially classified by the U.S., Israel, and the European Union as a terrorist organization.

    The creation of Hamas can be traced back to the Six-Day War in 1967. As a result of the war, Israel captured the Gaza Strip from Egypt and the West Bank from Jordan, beginning a long and brutal occupation of both territories. As a result of Israel’s occupation, the local populations became resentful, and a powerful resistance movement emerged. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood gained influence in Egypt as an Islamic political organization denouncing the occupation. One Palestinian cleric and activist in the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin began performing charitable work and preaching Islamic scripture in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Some of Yassin’s work and that of other activists included setting up schools, clinics, and youth clubs in Gaza and the West Bank. Initially, Yassin’s efforts were encouraged by some in the Israeli government, as it was believed that these efforts would discourage violence and allow for greater stability in the occupied territories. By 1987, Yassin established Hamas as the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip. Hamas was founded shortly after the first intifada, which was a Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

    The main political agenda of Hamas consists of the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Palestine and the liberation of the Palestinian territories from Israeli occupation. As many political parties and factions in Palestine do, Hamas views the occupation as a human rights violation. In addition, Hamas operates schools, hospitals, and religious institutions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and manages a highly effective social welfare system. As a result, the organizations popularity among the Palestinian people has grown. To achieve their goals, Hamas often carries out attacks against Israel through its military wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigade. According to a study by the Council on Foreign Relations, Hamas is believed to have killed roughly 500 people in 350 separate attacks since 1993.

    By 2005, Hamas began to get involved in electoral politics and immediately became a success. During the 2006 legislative elections, Hamas was able to gain a majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. As a result of Hamas’ win, the U.S., Israel, and the European Union placed economic sanctions against the Palestinian Authority. Fatah, a rival Palestinian political organization, initially formed a unity government with Hamas. However, Hamas ultimately seized unilateral control over the Gaza Strip in 2007. It was at this point that Israel began to hold Hamas responsible for all terrorist attacks emanating from the Gaza Strip and executed several military campaigns against Hamas. In the military campaigns, Israel conducted against Hamas in the Gaza Strip since 2006, some 5,000 people were killed, and much of the infrastructure of the Gaza Strip was destroyed. In addition, Israel implemented a blockade against Gaza to isolate Hamas. Despite the fact that Hamas was weakened military following its conflicts with Israel and internationally isolated, the Palestinian people grew to admire Hamas for surviving in the fight against Israel despite the odds stacked against them.

    Despite the fact that Europe, Israel, and the U.S. have condemned Hamas and view it as a terrorist organization, opinions regarding the organization vary throughout the Middle East. While countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt are wary of embracing Hamas, the leaders of Turkey and Qatar openly back Hamas as a way to bolster popular support in their countries. The main Middle East backers of Hamas are Iran and Syria. In the past, both countries supplied Hamas with weapons and various forms of sponsorship. As a result of events such as the Syrian Civil War, Syrian support for Hamas has been reduced. Furthermore, Hamas refused to send in troops to assist Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and has instead supported rebel groups fighting against his government. Additionally, international diplomacy has convinced Iran to reduce its funding for Hamas, and Iran has sought to increase its ties with separate resistance groups in the region. Due to the mixed opinion within the Middle East, the conflict between Hama and Israel is developing to a conflict between extremists and more moderate elements throughout the Middle East. Furthermore, the popular support for Hamas throughout the Middle East shows that the organization is becoming a socio-political movement with a message in support of Palestinian sovereignty that resonates throughout the Middle East.

    In conclusion, Hamas was originally established as a social movement to promote general welfare in occupied Palestine. Over time, Hamas has developed into a political and violent military faction with the support of a number of Middle Eastern countries. The methods of Hamas vary from conventional political activities such as participating in elections to less typical ones such as using violence to achieve its goals. In response, numerous Western countries denounced Hamas through sanctions and military actions. In addition, civilian casualties from Israeli attacks against Hamas have garnered sympathy for the group and the Palestinian people in recent years. The actions of both Hamas and Israel have polarized opinions across the world. Only time will tell if both Israel and Hamas will come together to mediate their disputes, which may not be possible at this point in time.

  • “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” Article Review

    “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” Article Review

    In his most recent Foreign Affairs article “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” political scientist Kenneth Waltz explores the background behind the debate over the Iranian nuclear program. Since 2002, a major discussion has emerged at the international level regarding the Iranian nuclear program and the true nature behind it. Many countries such as the US, Israel and the UK have argued that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, whereas the Iranian government has denied such claims and instead argues that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Additionally, the issue has resulted in increased tensions between Iran, the US, and Israel and serves as a roadblock preventing the normalization of ties between all three countries. In contrast to other political commentators and policy-makers, Waltz argues that that Iran possessing nuclear weapons would restore stability and correct the imbalance of power in the Middle East.

    Waltz feels that the Iranian nuclear program crisis could end in three possible outcomes. The first outcome is that Iran gives up its nuclear ambitions in the face of increased international sanctions and diplomacy. The next possibility is that Iran develops breakout capability (the ability to develop a nuclear weapon quickly), but stops short of testing a nuclear weapon. The third scenario is that Iran goes ahead and tests a nuclear weapon. Even though the US and Israel are strongly opposed to the last outcome, historical precedent shows that when a new state develops nuclear weapons, imbalances of power are reduced and regional stability typically emerges.

    Waltz argues that Iran is seeking to develop their own nuclear weapons in response to Israel’s nuclear weapon monopoly. For example, Israel has been a nuclear-armed state at least since the late 1970s and is one of 4 nuclear-armed states that is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons has served to increase instability within the Middle East, in addition to its hostile relations with its neighbors and support by the US. As opposed to using nuclear weapons offensively against the US or Israel, Waltz states that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons for its own purposes of national security and to correct the imbalance of power within the region.

    Waltz also mentions that another concern among Western leaders is that other countries would follow suit in developing nuclear weapons if Iran tests one, but history shows that there has been a slowdown in nuclear proliferation over the past few decades. Waltz further states that if both Iran and Israel are nuclear-armed states, they will deter each other and the chance of a major war between both will be less likely to occur. In conclusion, Waltz believes that the U.S. and its allies should give up their concerns about Iran developing nuclear weapons and take comfort in the regional stability that may emerge as a result. The arguments that waltz makes throughout the article present an entirely different picture regarding the Iranian nuclear program and offer an alternative view on the factors behind it.